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BLUNDERS IN TIGERLAND:  
PAPE’S MUDDLES ON “SUICIDE 
BOMBERS” IN SRI LANKA 
 
M I C H A E L  R O B E R T S  
 
Department of Anthropology, University of Adelaide 1
 
No study of the LTTE can afford to neglect Sri Lanka’s cultural, historical, 
and geographical backdrop The lack of existential awareness of religious 
cross-fertilisation, the either/or foundations of Western reasoning and 
absence of local knowledge bedevil the scholarship that incorporates Sri 
Lanka within their global surveys of suicide attacks. Pape’s Dying to Win is 
an example. Here, the LTTE’s multi-pronged capacities are poorly 
evaluated. Too much significance is attributed to the coercive success of 
SMs in bringing the government to the negotiating table at various 
moments. Religious persecution has not been the main reason for the Tamil 
strruggle. Comparative references to SMs elsewhere are occasionally 
interspersed in this review of the Sri Lankan scene. 
 
Following the events of 9/11 a veritable surge of academic writings on Al 
Qaeda and/or “suicide terrorism” has inundated bookshelves. Those that 
focus on “suicide bombers” tend to encompass several countries in their 
global surveys. Invariably this means that non-specialists are venturing into 
terrain – in its widest metaphorical meanings – that is unfamiliar. This 
problem is exacerbated by constraints of word length that demand concise 
summaries with the concomitant danger of gross oversimplification.  
     That is not all. Such surveys are informed by the popular pressures of an 
American market with its demand for the spectacular. Hence the 
highlighting of “suicide bombers” and “suicide terrorism,” terms that not 
only arouse attention, but also de-legitimize the activities of the 
organisations which are behind such activities. For the story of the Tamils of 
Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam such a slant skews 
                                                 
1 Michael Roberts is Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology, 
University of Adelaide. Contact: 1 Woodlark Grove, Glenalta, Adelaide 5052 Australia. 
Email: galle.mike@gmail.com. 
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analysis. To focus solely on the origins of the precision weapons known as 
suicide bombers is to concentrate on the end-point of a process and to 
neglect the wider context encompassing other forms of “gift/offering of 
self”i or “sacrificial devotion” by personnel aligned with the LTTE, such as 
the fast-unto-death and the swallowing of a cyanide capsule (the kuppi as 
the Tamils call it) when captured. My concept of “sacrificial devotion” is a 
considered label, one that attends to the inspirations promoting the 
commitment of Sri Lanka Tamils. It is deployed here as counterpoint to the 
pejorative terms “suicide terrorism” and “suicide bombers.” 
    Remarkably, most global reviews of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict seem 
unaware of the first cyanide suicide by Ponnudurai Sivakumaran on 5 June 
1974 (before the LTTE proper was in existenceii) when he was cornered 
somewhere in the Jaffna Peninsula after a botched attempt at assassinating a 
senior police officer.iii His was the first case of defensive suicide for cause, 
that cause being Thamilīlam, or Eelam in contemporary usage. This was 
prior to the birth of the LTTE. 
    It was a momentous episode. The funeral, a cremation, in his home 
village of Urumpurai (mostly Vellalar caste and with high literacy) became 
an expressive moment, an outpouring of intense grief and anger, the stuff of 
dramatic politics. Popular action decreed the day to be a one of hartal, that 
is a strike and demonstration of protest where all shops were closed and no 
work was done. Massive crowds journeyed to Sivakumaran’s home village. 
So too did venerable Tamil leaders, many of them lawyers of note. There, 
within the feverish fervour aroused by untimely death, these leaders were 
subject to assault by slippers wielded by angry young men.iv Being 
“slippered” is the ultimate in insults within Asia. It is a slap that proclaims 
a heinous transgression. The victim is deemed to have no moral ground. He 
must cop his fate silently.v
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Sivakumāran as Kattabommān 
Copy kindly provided by S. Visahan of 
the Tamil Information Centre, 
London. The medallion is a trademark 
for “Kalaignaani” Studio. 
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In the 1790s the British in the Madras Presidency had to subjugate a local 
chieftain named Kattabommān. A number of diverse folk tales subsequently 
developed among the local peoples about this chieftain-bandit. In the 20th 
century Kattabommān was picked up by Tamils partial to Dravidistan 
sentiments as their version of a freedom fighter. His “heroic exploits” were 
seen as an example of a “true Tamil warrior.” A film was produced in 1959 
with the famous Shivāji Ganeshan cast as Kattabommān. This replication of 
the hero not only reveals the influence of Tamilnadu politics and media 
among Tamil-speakers in Sri Lanka, but signals the heroic mould in which 
Sivakumāran was (is) cast.   
The main caption encompassing this picture says: “Do or Die.” 
 
Clarified in terms understandable to those in the West one could say that 
the slippering of Tamil leaders was the equivalent of leading American 
Congressmen being spat upon in public with impunity, thereby being 
branded as ‘animals’ beyond the pale. But within Tamil history this act of 
symbolic punishment -- there in Sivakumaran’s natal place -- is significant 
in heralding the immediate future. 
 
 
     Figure 2  
THE CHANGING OF 
THE GUARD.  
Copy kindly provided by 
S. Visahan of the Tamil 
Information Centre, 
London. 
 
Sivakumaran on the left 
stands next to the 
venerable and much-
admired leader of the 
former Federal Party, 
SJV Chelvanayakam 
(already ailing, who 
passed away in 1977).  
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The restive and violent young men were preparing, as we know with the 
advantage of hindsight, to oust their older, moderate parliamentary leaders. 
Sivakumaran had in fact set the stage for altruistic self-sacrifice. He was 
likened to Kattabomman, a recalcitrant chieftain who was hanged by the 
British in southern India in the 1790s and subsequently resurrected in 
modern Tamilnadu as a “freedom fighter;” while a statue was immediately 
erected in his honour by the people of the Jaffna Peninsula and thereafter a 
symbolic struggle occurred around this icon as the Sri Lankan army 
knocked it down repeatedly after it was rebuilt.vi   
 
    
Figure 3 . STATUE OF PONNUDURAI SIVAKUMĀRAN KNOCKED 
DOWN 
from National Geographic, 1979 p. 139  photo by Raghubir Singh 
 
There can be little doubt that Sivakumaran’s act captured the imagination of 
both the Tamil people and the LTTEvii when the latter emerged in 1976. 
From 1983 onwards if not earlier, recruits to the LTTE organisation not only 
take an oath of allegiance committing themselves to the organisation’s 
punita cutantiram (holy aim of liberation), but also promise to bite the kuppi 
that was around their necks if they were capturedviii. 
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Figure 4 
TIGER FIGHTERS WITH CYANIDE CAPSULES IN CAMP, c. 1989 
Photo by SHYAM TEKWANI, an Indian journalist embedded within LTTE 
during war against IPKF. 
Note that once their training is completed all LTTE fighters chant the 
folllowing oath in unison: 
“Our revolutionary organisation’s purified aim  
              is for a free society to achieve Tamil Eelam  
    
My life and soul and all this I sacrifice to our organisation’s leader, 
our brother, Mr Prabhakaran 
We fully accept that for him  
                     we will be very faithful and trustworthy. 
The aim of the Tigers – Tamils’ freedom.” 
Speaking to a BBC team in 1991 Adele Balasingham quietly stressed that 
“the cyanide capsule has come to symbolise a sense of self-sacrifice by 
cadres of the movement, their determination, their comitment to the cause, 
and ultimately, of course, their courage.” (BBC documentary on “Suicide 
Killers,” in their Inside Story serties, 1991). 
 
 
Initially the obvious goal here, as with Sivakumaran’s act, was to protect the 
underground guerilla movement; but that purpose remains even after the 
Tigers have become an armed state with guerilla extensions. Here, we are 
indebted to Peter Schalk for a remarkable fact: of all the LTTE deaths up to 
1992 he reckons that one third died by swallowing the kuppi.ix The epitaph 
for Selvam Pakin the first fighter to deploy this method in May 1984 reads 
“… having enjoyed cyanide, he died heroically.”x
      It was only after some internal debatexi that the LTTE hierarchy took the 
next logical step and extended the idea of suicide-in-defense to the concept 
of suicidal-attacks, humans as precision bombs. That innovation occurred 
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first on 5 July 1987 when Captain Miller drove a truck laden with 
explosives into an army camp at Nelliyadi during the latter’s 
Vadamaradchchi (Vatamaracci) offensive.xii This move may well have been 
inspired by the deployment of explosive-laden trucks by suicide bombers by 
Hezbollah and other forces in the Lebanon.xiii Clearly, as with most 
contemporary instances of suicide missions, such a tactic is a rational course 
for a weaker party in a conflict, especially a military confrontation with 
marked asymmetry in arsenals and airpower. However, in the case of the 
Tamils and LTTE the foundations of devotional commitment to death-for-
cause were firmly in place already. It is an error to commence one’s focus 
from Miller’s act of combat heroism,xiv without attending to the established 
policy of defensive suicides and Sivakumaran’s inspiration.  
     In September that same year, moreover, in a move orchestrated by the 
LTTE high command a senior LTTE fighter named Tilīpan mounted a fast-
unto-death as a political protest against the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) and its intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict. The LTTE had 
reluctantly accepted this intervention in July/August 1987, but was always 
suspicious of India’s imperialist programme. This was signalled by 
Pirapāharan himself when, returning from India as a hero after having his 
arm twisted, he addressed a massive crowd at the grounds of Sudumalai 
Amman Kōvil. 
 
Figure 5 
TAMILS EN MASSE  AT   SUDUMALAI  AMMAN  KOVIL AWAIT  
PIRAPĀHARAN’S  PERORATION, 4 August 198. 
Courtesy of ANCL, that is Lake House. 
 
 
Tilīpan’s fast was their first open confrontation with the IPKF, one that was 
strategically located alongside the main temple in Jaffna town at Nallur -- a 
symbolic site par excellence, one matching Wenceslas Square where Jan 
Palach immolated himself on 16 January 1968 in protest against the Soviet 
invasion in support of their local proxies.xv
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     Like the self-immolations carried out by Palach and those of the 
Buddhist monks in southern Vietnam,xvi this event was high theatre, a 
moment of emotion-laden drama magnified. In contrast to self-immolations 
it also had the advantage of being a long-drawn out affair. The emotional 
engagement of the people of both Jaffna town and the Jaffna Peninsula as a 
whole (and probably beyond) developed to a fever pitch.xvii When Tilīpan 
(who was refused water by his minders even when he asked for some) died 
on 26 September 1987, the emotions bubbled among the Tamils of Sri 
Lanka and rippled along the networks making up the Tamil diaspora in 
numerous countries.xviii The Indian occupation stood condemned. When 18 
months later, in April 1989 a mother of ten, Annai Pupati (also spelt 
Poopathi), fasted unto death in the Eastern Province in support of the 
demand that the IPKF should leave the island, the last nail, more or less, had 
been inserted into the Indian coffin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6 
ANNAI PUPATI CUT-OUT, 19 APRIL 2004. Courtesy of TamilNet.com 
Annai Pupati, a mother of ten children, fasted unto death in the Eastern Province 
in April 1988 as part of the LTTE agitation against the “occupaion” of their lands 
by the IPKF. In brief, she replicated the action of another LTTE hero or martyr 
(tiyaki), Lt. Col. Tileepan, who fasted unto death in September 1987in protest 
against the IPKF’s entry.  
 
     The popular emotions, whether anger, pride and/or defiant enthusiasm, 
that developed around such events among many Tamil people, both in Sri 
Lanka and abroad, indicate a cultural background that understood 
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(understands) suicidal protest to be a worthy cause. Thus, as I have argued 
elsewhere, one has to look at the deep history and culture of sacrificial 
devotion among the Tamil peoples of both India and Sri Lankaxix – ranging 
backwards not only to medieval or early modern times, but also attending to 
the acts of self-immolation carried out by Chinnasami and other Tamil 
youth in 1964/65 in Tamilnadu protesting against the creeping hegemony, as 
they conceived it, of the Hindi language in federated Indiaxx as well the 
suicides in sympathetic grief that occurred after Mrs Indira Gandhi was 
assassinated on 31 October 1984 and when the actor-turned politician in 
Tamilnadu, M. G. Ramachandran, was reported to be at death’s door in 
October 1984 and when he died subsequently on 24 December 1987.xxi 
Moreover, any scholar attending to the incidence of suicide as well as 
“suicide terrorism” in southern Asia must necessarily attend to the faith in 
fierce deities revealed by many a Tamil person and the regular acts of 
surrogate sacrifice tendered by Tamil Saivite devotees seeking protection 
and/or boons.xxii These “votive rituals are full of sacrificial symbolism.”xxiii 
As Bastin remarks, “breaking a coconut is both a standard devotional act 
with strong interpretations from devotees that liken the nut to a human head, 
and the breaking to a sublimated form of self-sacrifice.”xxiv
      Central to the prolonged festivals associated with such deities as 
Bhadrakali and Draupadi at major regional temples as well as local ones is 
the “theme of renewal.”xxv In brief, such participatory activities convey the 
idea of a deity born in violence, a cosmic force that is an embodiment of 
“creative destruction” and “creative sacrifice.”xxvi Thus they re-enact a basic 
proposition in Hindu thought, and thereby in Tamil Saivism, namely that 
“life is born out of darkness; death itself is the creator.”xxvii Within such a 
context the widespread characterisation of the LTTE as a “secular 
organisation,” their soldiers as “secular terrorists,” and their fallen as secular 
heroes is quite misplaced.xxviii Where supra-mundane forces are intrinsic 
facets for some actors and for some part of the local constituency, the 
concept “secular” is misleadng. 
    In brief, a focus on suicide attackers alone neglects the conditions of 
possibility that engender and encourage sacrificial devotion to a cause. Such 
a narrow focus also obscures the historical and contextual factors that 
encourage the people on whose behalf these acts are carried out to 
empathize with such practices and to assign profound worth to such 
unselfish commitment.xxix
 
Sri Lanka’s History in Brief 
The failure to give adequate weight to cultural and historical factors in the 
recent story of Sri Lanka is revealed in Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of 
Suicide Terrorism by Robert Pape (2005), where this fundamental flaw is 
compounded still further by poor background knowledge. His work 
represents a whole genre of political science writings on the subject,xxx but 
has been selected here as a particular illustration of my general critique 
because of the verve with which Pape has advertised his argument in media 
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circles. More vitally, he has found recognition in a site that is more or less a 
mouthpiece for the LTTE, namely TamilNet.xxxi In a news item displayed on 
their website on 26 June 2005 both Mia Bloomxxxii and Pape received 
favourable notice with their pictures accompanying brief reportage under 
the caption “Dying to Kill: US Academic examines causes of suicide 
terror.” The punchline is at the end: “in an article covering the same topic 
that appeared in New York Times in May, Robert A. Pape, associate 
professor of political science at the University of Chicago, says: ‘What 
nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and 
strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces 
from territories that the terrorists consider to be their homeland…’.”  
     Pape, in brief, has been good propaganda value for the LTTE because 
he stresses what Tamils in Sri Lanka desire and what most scholars will 
accept: namely, that the Tamils of Sri Lanka are pursuing self-determination 
as a nation state and seeking specified territories within the island. But once 
we begin to consider the demarcation of the “Tamil homelands” and the 
historical justifications of their claims and grievances one enters highly 
contentious ground. Thus, a brief outline of Sri Lanka’s history is essential 
background, together with selective facets of the cultural terrain.  
     Sri Lanka has a long history with records that date back to the last 
millennium BCE. The terrain of “who came first” is now a raging battlefield 
for debate, both academic and popular, involving varying measures of 
partisanship. It is probable that the migrants of the megalithic culture who 
joined the mesolithic indigenes during the middle centuries of the last 
millennium BCE originated mostly in southern India and were mostly 
speakers of Tamil or Tamil Prakrit. However, Buddhism (which also was 
the faith of some Tamil-speakers) was introduced into Sri Lanka in the third 
century BCE and adopted by one of the principal chieftains. Moreover, the 
early inscriptions of the third to first century BCE “show that there was little 
variation in language and script in various parts of the island,” leading to the 
“conjecture that the various streams of migrants had begun to acquire the 
rudiments of a common culture.”xxxiii Older scholarship, including the works 
of Geiger, deemed the language of these inscriptions to be “Proto-Sinhala” 
or “Sinhala-Prakrit.” I am not in a position to say whether scholars today 
would support this conclusion: to settle this issue one requires a specialist 
colloquium rather than academic ships that pass each other in the night. 
     Be that as it may, it is probable that the language of the last centuries 
BCE evolved into what became identified as Sinhala or Elu by the 4th/5th 
centuries CE, if not earlier.xxxiv This remark is based on (a) the Indian visitor 
Buddhagōsha’s statement in the fifth century CE and (b) the evidence of 
palm-leaf manuscripts and inscriptions during the latter half of the first 
millennium CE. By the twelfth century this script and language eventually 
became consolidated into the Sinhala script and language that is known 
today.  
     Thus, there is reason to assume that the Tamil-speakers of the centuries 
BCE had mostly become Sinhala speakers by the fifth and sixth centuries 
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CE within the so-called “hydraulic civilization” commanded by Sinhalese 
kings centred in the northern and eastern regions, but also embracing the 
south eastern corner of the island. It was not till the thirteenth century that a 
state known as the Kingdom of Yālppānam (Kingdom of Jaffna), a dynastic 
state centred upon Tamil speakers, developed in the extreme north of the 
island as a result of invasions from south Indian feudatories whose Tamil-
speaking descendants merged with local residents who adopted Tamil as 
their own.  
     In brief, both sets of speakers, Tamil and Sinhala, can claim to be among 
the original inhabitants in the last millennium BCE. However, to the extent 
that one privileges state power 
as well as the force of numbers, as I do in relation to the first millennium 
CE, the claims of the Sinhalese are stronger from the fourth century CE 
onwards if not earlier.xxxv Both the political economy and the political 
dispensation altered radically from the 13th century when the “hydraulic 
civilisation” in the north central regions around Anuradhapura declined and 
the Sinhala kingdoms shifted south west and became centred within the 
western and/or central regions of the island. The political relations between 
these kingdoms and the new Yālpānnam (1300 to circa 1619) were 
constrained by the vast malaria ridden and sparsely populated jungles that 
had overwhelmed the north central parts of the island and created a buffer 
zone. Though there seem to have been Tamil-speakers under local chieftains 
along the eastern littoral, these areas fell within the suzreignity of the 
Kingdoms of Kottē (circa 1400-1550s), Sitāvaka (1521-80s) and Kandy 
(1590s-1815), each of which was known as Sinhalē or Tunsinhalaya and 
claimed overlordship over the island in a manner typical of the centre-
oriented “galactic polities” of Asia.xxxvi
    The kingdoms of Yālpānnam, Kottē and Sitāvaka fell under the sway of 
the Portuguese at various points between the 1550s and 1619, but that of 
Kandy held out and also resisted the Dutch and British who took over most 
of the maritime districts at different stages (1638-58 and 1795-96 
respectively). It was not till the years 1815-18 that the British took over and 
consolidated their hold over the interior Kingdom of Kandy, a state which 
had territorial overlordship of the whole eastern coast. 
     British rule involved a considerable transformation in the political 
economy of the island, a revolution in the communication system, the 
administrative unification of the country and the emergence of new class 
forces of a capitalist variety. English became the administrative language 
and one saw the development of an elite referred to locally as “middle class” 
whose mode of domination included a facility in English-speak, a particular 
life style and the wearing of trousers by males. Both the bourgeoisie and the 
overlapping folk category of the ‘middle class’ included elements from all 
the ethnic groups, Tamils, Sinhalese, Burghers, Moors, Malays, Borahs, 
Sindhis, Parsees and Colombo Chetties. Most of these Tamils were families 
from the Jaffna Peninsula, several of whom became permanent residents in 
the island’s hegemonic centre, Colombo.xxxvii
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     The British period (1795-1948) was also featured by currents of Hindu 
and Buddhist revitalisation in opposition to the aggressive proselytisation 
activities of Christian missionary organisations. The latter half of Britsh rule 
also saw three strands of political ferment: Sri Lankan nationalism, Sinhala 
nationalism and Tamil communitarianism,xxxviii with the spokesmen 
representing the latter two currents sometimes overlapping ambivalently 
with the organisations (e.g. the Ceylon National Congress) standing for all 
the island peoples in opposition to the colonial rulers. 
     Taking advantage of its small size, the British Empire’s confidence in its 
naval power and its own manifest Westernisation (or ‘Anglo-ness’), the Sri 
Lankan political elites extracted a devolution of power in several steps 
between 1918 and 1948 without the strategies of mass mobilisation that 
were deployed by its counterparts in British India. But the current of Sinhala 
linguistic nationalism was waiting in the wings. At the general elections of 
1956 this ideological force thrust its way forward under the aegis of a 
coalition in which the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by S. W. R. D. 
Bandaranaike was the principal element. They secured a massive electoral 
victory that was largely due to the catch-cry “Sinhala Only,” a blow directed 
at the English-speakers that at the same time rendered Tamil inferior or 
second class. 
     These forces of Sinhala linguistic nationalism secured the heights of 
power in 1956 in alliance with the underprivileged seeking a place in the 
sun. Socialist forces, embodied in the Ceylon Communist Party (CCP) and 
the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), were part of this thrust. Several 
Tamils occupied important roles within the CCP and the LSSP. But the 
leanings of Tamil radical socialists were severely undermined subsequently 
in 1964 when both these parties abandoned their principled programme of 
parity for the two vernacular languages, Tamil and Sinhala, and joined the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party in another electoral alliance committed to the 
economic and status gains deriving from the primacy of the Sinhala 
language in the government sector. This was a capitulation to the 
implications of demographic weight in the existing electoral scheme of 
things. 
     Though the Federal Party gained a toehold in government in 1965 when 
the United National Party returned to power in 1965, that experience of 
partial clout was dispiriting because of the manner in which even the limited 
decentralization under a proposed District Councils Bill was abandoned.xxxix 
That was but one piece of evidence indicating how powerful, chauvinist 
Sinhala thinking coursed through politics. Such sentiments worked in 
subterranean ways as one factor behind the return of the SLFP to power in 
mid-1970 in association with the CCP and LSSP under an umbrella 
association known as the United Front (UF) headed by Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike.xl It was this combination that initiated a new republican 
constitution in 1972, a set-up that discarded the meagre constitutional 
safeguards valued by some Tamil leaders.  
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     These developments exposed certain debilitating, structural features 
within the Sri Lankan polity, namely, the deadly combination of (A) a 
peculiar demographic composition that was (B) distributed in space in ways 
which (C) tilted the democratic voting patterns in a particular direction and 
ensured that governments were made or unmade in the Sinhala-majority 
districts. 
      In other words the particular species of democracy prevailing in Sri 
Lanka encouraged and exacerbated Sinhala linguistic nationalism in its 
extreme chauvinistic forms and has continually made compromise difficult. 
The constitution of 1947 was modeled on that of Westminster and involved 
a system of parliamentary elections on a first-past-the-post scheme. Given 
the respective numerical proportions of Sinhalese, Sri Lanka Tamils, Indian 
Tamils and Muslims and their peculiar spatial distribution, this meant that 
victory at the general elections was decided in the Sinhala-majority areas. 
Further, a small swing in the percentage of votes generated major swings in 
parliamentary power. Once the Sinhala Only political platform with populist 
tendencies engineered a change of government in 1956, therefore, it was not 
in the interests of the leading parties to grant concessions to the Tamils.xli
     In summary, then, the chief reasons for this heightening of Tamil 
grievances and aspirations were (1) the ramifying economic and political 
implications of a programme that made Sinhala the language of 
administration after the populist victory at the 1956 general elections; (2) 
the effect and memories of a mini-pogrom against Tamils n the south 
western regions in May-June 1958; (3) the structural implications of the 
island’s demographic distribution working in conjunction with (4) the 
further structural tilt induced by the Westminster model of government; (5) 
a measure of discrimination inserted into state policies in administrative 
recruitment as a result of statutory acts and the growing influence of 
administrators with Sinhala prejudices;xlii (6) the SLT peoples’ hostile 
readings (whether justified, exaggerated or imagined) of the state sponsored 
colonisation schemes pursued in the dry zone of Sri Lanka;xliii (7) the 
gerrymandering of admissions to the prestigious science faculties from 1970 
in ways that disadvantaged the Tamils of Jaffna;xliv (8) the manner in which 
a new republican constitution was set up in 1972; and (9) a localised clash 
in January 1974 between the police and a large crowd that had assembled 
for the International Conference of Tamil Studies, a confrontation which 
resulted in a few deaths from electrocution because a telegraph pole tumbled 
down at the height of a baton charge.xlv  
 
Tamil Nationalism Escalates: the Demand for Eelam 
The summary above serves to highlight the period 1970-76 as a critical 
stage in the growing estrangement between Sinhalese and Sri Lanka Tamils 
(SLT). It was within this period that a few restive Tamil youth formed 
revolutionary underground cells in the Jaffna Peninsula. One of these, 
known as the Tamil New Tigers, was set up around 1972 and included 
young Pirapāharan as well as Periya Sothi (his cousin) and several young 
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men older than him, namely, Chetti Thanabalasingham, Sivarajah, Ramesh, 
Inbam, Kannady, Saravanam (alias Patkunarajah), Kalapathy, Kirupaharan, 
Pandithar and Baby Subramaniumxlvi. 
      It was in this period too that the Federal Party transformed itself into the 
Tamil United Front in 1972 and then again re-shaped itself as the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976. This second act of renaming was 
taken at the moment when the TULF adopted the Vadukoddai Resolution in 
May 1976 which asserted that their goal was self-determination as a state to 
be named Eelam. In decisive mode, then, the Tamils of yesteryear had 
moved from a position of sectional nationalism within the umbrella “Sri 
Lankan” to a position outside the latter category. Their nationalism was now 
explicitly secessonist. The die had been cast. 
      The leaders of old still had some faith in the parliamentary methods of 
pressure. Not so the restive and radicalised youth dwelling within the Jaffna 
Peninsula and northern reaches of the island, among them such lads as 
Ponnudurai Sivakumaran and Velupillai Pirapāharan. Their methods were to 
be through violent seizure of their rights, liberation through gun and bomb. 
At the same time others in London, generally of strong socialist or Marxist 
persuasion, banded together in various networks of ferment a handful 
established links with the Palestine Liberation Organisation and secured 
military training. It is now known that several of the militant youth emerged 
from the youth leagues attached to the FP and TULF. Indeed, Hoffman & 
McCormack’s interviews led them to the conclusion that some of the 
clandestine youth cells were secret extensions of the TULF.xlvii The key link 
was A. Amirthalingam, deputy chief of the FP, who laboured under the 
misapprehension that he was their controller. He learnt otherwise in 1981 
when the LTTE leaders and other radical youth virulently opposed the 
TULF’s decision to participate in the district council elections, a move that 
was interpreted as a compromising legitimisation of the Sri Lankan 
state.xlviii
     Though episodic the attacks on the ‘occupying’ security forces within the 
Jaffna Peninsula increased in number. The burning of the Jaffna Library by 
ill-disciplined policemen in June 1981 and the severe pogrom in July 1983 
directed against Tamils living in the south-central regions of Sri Lanka -- 
involving state agents (marshaled by some senior politicians) as well as 
significant popular participation -- deepened the chasm between the SLT on 
the one hand and the Sinhala majoritarian government and peoples on the 
other. 
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 Figure 7 
POGROM OF 1983. Rioters at Borella Junction, 24/25 July 1983. Picture 
by Chandragupta Amarasinghe & kindly supplied by him. 
 
This was one of the initiating moments of the pogrom of July 1983 which 
terrorised Tamils living in Colombo and other areas with a Sinhalese 
majority. The attacks on person and property deemed Tamil was not 
restricted to state functionaries but also included segments of the Sinhala 
populace. 
 
     Thus, the pogrom of July 1983 was yet another turning point in a process 
with many such spirals towards ever-sharpening conflict. After this awful 
event, Sinhala majoritarianism stood condemned in the international scene. 
Both the Indian and Tamilnadu governments proceeded to assist the militant 
Tamil organisations in material ways. The moderate Tamil parliamentarians 
were pushed to the sidelines and few could now reside in the heartland 
within the Jaffna Peninsula. Recruits to the militant organisations increased 
thousandfold. The competition for support among the underground groups 
of Eelamists had encouraged the spiraling of militancy from the 1970s. 
Now, post July 1983, the hardcore of some 27 or so fighters that had made 
up the LTTE up to that stagexlix  expanded rapidly, but did so within the 
highly disciplined and ascetic ways instilled by Pirapāharan and second-in-
command Mahattayā, namely, Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja.l  
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Figure 8 
YOUNG PIRAPĀHARAN. Back cover of a notebook purchased by Michael 
Roberts at Kilinochchi in Nov. 2004. 
 
 
Figure 9 
PIRAPĀHARAN PAYS HOMAGE TO BLACK TIGERS, 5 July 2005 
Courtesy of TamilNet.com 
 
The picture on the wall is that of Miller (Vallipuram Vasanthan), who drove 
a truck laden with explosives into an army camp at Nelliyadi on 5 July 
1987, the first LTTE suicide attack. Note the symbolism of flames and 
Miller’s encirclement by flowers in keeping with a whole genre of “circling 
rituals” (ārati in Sanskritic Tamil) that are intended to remove unwanted 
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negatives from a person or place. Other practices during Māvīrar Nal in 
November indicate that the māvīrar are symbolically encircled and 
protected by cosmic forces marked by the jasmine flower or glory lily. This 
is a Tantric principle that has been incorporated within Hindu orthodoxies 
without necessarily being recognised as Tantric. 
 
Carrying a cyanide capsule, as we have seen at the start of this essay, was an 
integral part of this discipline and a testimony to their readiness to embrace 
death. As a Protestant Tamil octogenerian who had lived in the Peninsula 
through the early 1980s told me in admiration one day in Adelaide: “the 
devotion that the Tigers showed was unmatched.”li  
     Thus, as symbol the cyanide capsule gave the LTTE an edge in the 
struggle with other fighting groups for Tamil support. This edge was 
sharpened by killing ruthlessness. TELO was severely decimated by attack 
and hunt in April-May 1986, while the EPRLF politbureau was gunned 
down during one of their meetings in Chennai by an LTTE commando team 
on 19 June 1990. EROS and eventually PLOTE began to wither away.lii By 
late 1987 the LTTE stood at the pinnacle of fighting resistance to the 
Sinhala majoritarian government. Through periodic assassinations of Tamil 
moderate leaders over the yearsliii and, eventually in the 1990s, by their 
successful military campaigns against the IPKF from 1987-90 and the Sri 
Lankan state in the 1990s, they turned the new leaders of the TULF into 
more or less supportive lap-dogs ready to acquiesce – from circa 1999 -- in 
the principle that the “LTTE is the sole representative of the [SL] Tamils.” 
      
Pape on the LTTE: A Suicide Pack Full of Errors 
The analytical narrative set out above, for the most part in chronological 
form, serves as a foundation for the specification of serious errors in Pape’s 
case study of the Tamil Tigers as well as a brief discussion of the LTTE’s 
suicide missions within this context. Besides TamilNet’s appropriation of 
one of his sound bites for their global propaganda (noted above), the manner 
in which Pape has been used to support specific claims about the LTTE by 
other scholars renders such a task imperative. 
     Pape’s unfamiliarity with both the history of the island peoples over the 
past centuries as well as the geopolitical contours of the contemporary 
struggle in Sri Lanka is quite glaring to any insider. There is no suggestion 
that he is aware that today in Sri Lanka virtually 45 percent of  the Sri 
Lankan Tamils (as distinct from Malaiyaha Tamilsliv) live in the regions 
outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Eelam-to-be at its minimum 
ambit claim)lv and that a substantial number of Tamils, 251,007 persons in 
sum, resided in the greater metropolitan area of Colombo in 2001, making 
up roughly 24 percent of its total populationlvi -- and providing segments 
who serve as a fifth column within which LTTE assassins and commando 
teams can hide before they strike. This would be equivalent to having 
Japanese Americans making up one quarter of the population in and around 
San Francisco during World War Two. 
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     This is compounded by the credulous manner in which Pape accepts all 
the claims to a “traditional homeland” presented by the LTTE and other 
Tamils. This homeland, Eelam-to-be, is identified by the existing 
boundaries of the Eastern and Northern Provinces. He is unaware that these 
boundaries are arbitrary lines on the map drawn up by the British in much 
the same fashion as so many African boundaries were delimited and that the 
eastern regions were part of a Sinhala kingdom till the 18th century.lvii Thus, 
by stating that the “Tamil minority are (sic) concentrated in the north -- 
ancestral homeland since Hindus first began migrating to the island in the 
sixth century B. C.,” he leaves one aghast at the majesty of his historical 
sweep as much as the abysmal knowledge of a complex history.  
     Such errors may not concern specialists whose focus is directed towards 
the specifics of insurgency, “terrorism” and “suicide missions.” But within 
this arena, too, Pape misleads. Perhaps his most glaring mistake is the 
contention that hostility aroused by religious persecution provides a major 
imperative for the suicidal zeal among Tiger personnel and the widespread 
acceptance of such tactics among the Sri Lanka Tamil peoples.lviii  His 
initial comment is expanded thus: 
 
Sinhalese occupation of Tamil lands created the core 
necessary condition for the Tamil community to support 
national resistance at all. However, the politics of religious 
difference helped to intensify the resistance and to encourage 
public support for suicide terrorism. … The most prominent 
factor driving Tamil community support for individual self-
sacrifice is fear of Buddhist extremism. Especially since the 
establishment of the new state constitution in 1972, prominent 
Tamil leaders have consistently claimed that the Sinhalese 
government is motivated by the goal to extend Buddhism into 
the Tamil regions of the island, a religious game plan that 
justifies treating the Tamil people harshly, which in turn 
justifies extreme self-sacrifice as necessary to meet the 
threat.lix
 
Fear of religious persecution, not internal dynamics within 
Tamil society, largely accounts for the pervasive use of 
suicide terrorism in this case.”lx
 
These comments are founded on the credulous acceptance of extreme claims 
by propagandists for the Tamil cause.lxi True, the constitution of 1972 
accords Buddhism “the foremost place” and enjoins the state to “protect and 
foster” Buddhism. But other clauses recognized the rights of other religions. 
This caveat in turn was compromised by the fact that the legislature was 
rendered supreme and not subject to judicial oversight on the issue of 
religious rights. So there were genuine concerns among constitutional 
experts on this issue.lxii  
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     From a socio-political viewpoint, however, the more critical domain is 
that of practice. For the most part, subject to some qualifications, people in 
Sri Lanka pursue their faiths without hindrance.lxiii Religious toleration is 
widespread and quite profound. Official holidays recognise the main 
religious calendar of every single faith. The substantial Tamil populace in 
Colombo and elsewhere in the south freely express their Saivite faith and 
mount teeming, tumultuous processions in the heart of districts with a 
Sinhalese majority.lxiv
     The religious practices of the multi-ethnic areas are also characterised by 
a significant degree of cross-fertilisation. Formal boundaries are crossed as 
people with anxieties and desires seek cosmic support from powerful deities 
from every which way. A visit to a religious festival at such places as the 
Hindu-dominated complex at Munnesvaram some 30 miles from Colombo 
or the distant religious site at Kataragama, whose god Kataragama is 
regarded as Murugan by Hindus, would reveal a measure of pluralism that 
amazes the average Westerner.lxv
      This, then, is part of Pape’s problem. He probably has no existential 
awareness of this type of world. Most Westerners, especially those in 
Europe, are nurtured either in contexts that are highly secular or where the 
divide between the Protestants and the Catholics is institutionalised and 
quite marked in everyday practices. Pape, moreover, is addressing this issue 
from an ‘insular’ chamber arising from 9/11 and the resulting “war on 
terror” organized in terms of the Muslim-Christian divide. As I see it, the 
conditions of his own universe of being are insidiously read unto the 
unfamiliar Sri Lankan context. In the process he conveniently effaces the 
presence of Christians on both sides of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. 
     Most critically, Pape gives little weight to the powerful involvement of 
Catholics within the LTTE networks of support.lxvi Within a context where 
roughly 90 percent of the Christian Tamil population is Catholic, it is 
significant that the census of 1981 records that Christians constituted 41%, 
11.5% and 15.2% of the total population of Mannar, Jaffna and Mullaitivu 
Districts respectively -- thus outnumbering the Hindus (27 per cent) in 
Mannar.lxvii Catholic clergymen have been staunch and articulate 
spokesmen for the LTTE cause from early days.lxviii  The second in 
command in 1983 seems to have been Seelan alias Charles Anthony till he 
died in action on 6 July 1983, while the regional commander for Mannar in 
the mid-1980s was Victor (Marcelin Fusles), also Catholic; while prominent 
LTTE figures of the 1980s, such as Anton Balasingham, Rahim 
(Canagaratnam) and Lawrence Thilakar (John Chrisostrom), were also from 
a Catholic background; while twenty of the 240 Black Tiger dead listed in 
the LTTE’s Sooriya Puthalvargal 2003 Souvenir have been identified as 
Catholics by a staunch Tiger supporter.lxix  
    The wide range of support that the LTTE has received from across the 
religious spectrumlxx from 1983, if not earlier, can be attributed to the 
grievances set out in the previously within this article and what many 
observers characterise in summary as a recent history of Sinhala 
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majoritarianism.lxxi For the same reasons the LTTE has support from across 
the class spectrum, whether you depict ‘class’ in terms of propertied and 
non-propertied or in terms of a folk stratification model referring to the 
middle class, lower middle class and working class.  
     Pirapāharan himself came from a family which had been among the 
trustees of the main temple at Velvettithurai (VVT) for generations. His 
father was a clerk who had risen in the administrative service and was a 
propertied man.lxxii The Karaiyar in general and those of VVT in particular 
have a long seafaring tradition and one can conjecture that they took 
advantage of the sea lanes of the British empire, just like the Karāva of 
Galle, to establish business interests far and wide. VVT is also known to 
have excelled in the smuggling trade with India, Burma etc. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs in the fishing industry from VVT and the north would have 
had links and interests in the beach seine operations along the length of the 
eastern coast. The VVT Karaiyar have had special rights in the Verugal 
Kovil in Trincomalee town for over a century and have settled in 
Thirukadaloor locality in the town. The VVT Karaiyar are also said to have 
landlord interests in various parts of the Eastern Province.lxxiii One can 
reasonably surmise that these networks were of critical importance in the 
survival and growth of the LTTE during the initial decades.  
     The seafaring networks of the Karaiyar caste as a whole may also have 
assisted the formation of a global shipping company that has been a major 
pillar in their logistical operations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
PROCESSION FOR THE    WATER-CUTTING RITE, PILLAIYAR 
TEMPLE, VELVITTATURA, AUG. 2004 
Courtesy of Tamil Net. 
This festival has been recently revived. The following description was 
provided: 
“For sea faring residents and fishermen from the town of Valvettiturai 
located in the northern shores of Jaffna, temples dotting the town's 
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landscape provide solace and protection from the dangers that accompany 
their trade. Boat festivals, where the elephant-faced god 'Ganapathi' is 
taken around the town in a boat shaped vehicle, are being celebrated with 
renewed cultural traditions, in the current climate of peace. In August and 
September Hindu temple festivals turn Jaffna into a virtual spiritual town. 
Mavattapuram temple located in the High Security Zone in Keerimalai, 
Nallur temple, Sellasannithi in Thondamannar are among the most popular 
temples where the festivals can last for 26 days. The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) 
made special provisions for devotees to attend the Car festival ("Ther") and 
stay overnight for the water cutting ceremony at the Mavattapuram temple, 
this year. In Valvettiturai, "Kappalodiya Pillaiyar" temple located near the 
town center, held its water cutting ceremony in the middle of August. 
During this festival the deity is taken to Oorani shores, a few kilometers east 
of town, for the water cutting ceremony, and brought back to the temple in a 
procession.  
Every household places a table at the entrance with religious artifacts 
including lamps and vase filled with water. The procession moves slowly 
through the narrow streets stopping at every house for the priest to perform 
a short religious ritual.  
[The] Deity's protection is sought with a visit to the Pillaiyar temple by 
everyone before he/she ventures out into sea.” 
 
Thus, the LTTE quickly became a transnational corporation (see elaboration 
below) via its links with businessmen and professionals -- from all castes, 
but especially Karaiyar and Civiyārlxxiv -- in the vast Tamil diaspora who 
were alienated by what happened to their people in Sri Lanka, particularly in 
July 1983. In this sense the LTTE is a worldwide network of the propertied 
and the entrepreneurial. Given such foundations it is hardly surprising that 
the concept of the “proletariat” does not figure prominently in Tiger-speak. 
For anyone to read the LTTE as “Marxist-Leninist,” as Pape does,lxxv is 
quite preposterous and it is not surprising that Sachi Sri Kantha, an avid 
LTTE supporter, should chide Robert Pape for presenting such a 
statement.lxxvi  
     As vitally, the LTTE has drawn its fighters from all castes, including the 
highest rung Vellalar, who made up perhaps half the population in the Jaffna 
Peninsula in the past. The exigencies of war as well as the LTTE”s 
ideological inclinations have consolidated a transformation in caste relations 
in the Peninsula over the last 40 years. The ubiquitous tea boutique had been 
a Vellalar monopoly for ages in part because they controlled the wells that 
were a vital adjunct for this trade; but the penetration of other caste people 
into this line of business which had begun from the 1960s gathered rapif d 
momentum in the LTTE era.lxxvii Again, fighting skills must have provided a 
channel of mobility for all castes, especially, I suspect, the Nallava and 
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Pallar menial people of yesteryear. That stated, the fact remains that the 
LTTE leadership from 1982 has always been centred upon a Karaiyar 
core.lxxviii Speculatively, it appears that Sageman’s thesis regarding the 
importance of small cliques of kin and friends in the recruitment of 
personnel to the cause of the “global Salafi jihad” can, with necessary 
adjustments, be extended to the LTTE’s formative years.lxxix In the Tamil 
context, of course, to say kin is to say caste. However, some of the LTTE 
leaders married across caste; and the war situation seems to have 
encouraged marriages between fighters and ex-fighters, while fragmentary 
data points to individuals marrying sisters of their peers (so too among the 
Al-Qaida and radical Islamic personnel studied by Sageman).lxxx
     As significantly, the outbreak of armed conflict encouraged many of the 
militant Eelamist groups to recruit women as auxiliaries. As the struggle 
gathered momentum the exigencies of war, manpower needs and the 
LTTE’s own ideological leanings led them to develop female units, both on 
land and sea.  
The influence of the Australian Adele Balasingham, communist in her youth 
and since married to the LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, was one 
voice encouraging this development from within leadership ranks.lxxxi 
Female recruitment expanded considerably from 1990 when what is called 
Eelam War II commenced. Female fighters were expected to perform the 
same tasks as their male counterparts, though they were trained from 1990 
at separate camps run by female commanders.lxxxii Women have been a 
significant element in the Black Tiger suicide operations and the work of 
soldier video camerapersons known as the “Truth Tigers.”lxxxiii Thus, we see 
a process of female empowerment within the LTTE that has ramified 
throughout Tamil society. The woman combatant has moved into public 
space beyond traditional patriarchal containment. 
 Figure 11 
FEMALE FIGHTERS, LTTE 
Courtesy TamilNet, 13 March 200 from notebook in author’s 
possession 
 
The picture shows “two young, Catholic females, with the nom de guerre 
'Dharsika' and 'Puhalchudar', who have been LTTE fighters since their 
teens and have become part of LTTE's elite force, the Black Tigers.” The 
two warriors anchor a documentary film made recently by a Norwegian, 
Beate Arnestad, one adverised within TamilNet. 
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The picture on the left shows Malathi, or …, who was the first female fighter 
to die. She bit her cyanide capsule when wounded and about to be captured 
on. 
        
 But, as de Mel reveals, this is at a price: one that “denies the militant a 
personality and emotional expression of his/her own and [subjects him/her] 
to the will of the militant leadership s/he struggles on behalf of.”lxxxiv An 
early LTTE propaganda pamphlet (1983) arguing the case for female 
participation even displayed a picture of a Palestinian woman with gun in 
one hand and baby in other. This combination of warrior woman and 
mother, notes de Mel, thereby reproduces restraints on female sexuality and 
re-introduces the figure of the fierce goddess (Sita in one famous Tamil 
text) working within the aegis of a greater male god, Rama.lxxxv
     It is the LTTE’s suicide attacks and their Black Tigers in particular that 
have attracted the attention of foreign scholars engaged in comparative 
exercises.  
Figure 12 
BLACK TIGERS MARCHING. Date uncertain. 
 
This image was extracted for me by a Tamil friend from internet sources 
partial to the LTTE. The location is definitely on the A9 at Kilinochchi. The 
Black Tigers are elite commando troops and do not always function as 
units. It is from their ranks that the suicide attackers and assassins are 
selected. 
 
Pape’s work is one such survey. He uses the LTTE as one prop for his 
broad, global generalisation to the effect that such tactics are successful by 
contending that the Tiger’s suicide attacks have exercised coercive effect in 
Sri Lanka by bringing the Sinhala-dominated governments to the 
negotiating table.lxxxvi Unfortunately, this assessment has been blithely 
accepted in a few other surveys seeking to generate statistical comparisons 
of the ‘success rate’ of SMs in order to reach conclusions about their 
rationality.lxxxvii  
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     The different governments in Colombo have sat together with the LTTE 
at the table on three occasions, in late 1989/90, early 1995 and early 2002. 
All three moments were preceded by change of key personnel at the top in 
Colombo. In late 1989 the new, highly indigenist President, R. Premadasa, 
was intent of effecting the diplomatic withdrawal of the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force who were keeping the LTTE under controllxxxviii at the price 
of reduced state sovereignty. Since this suited the LTTE, they sat down with 
Premadasa’s team to push for Indian withdrawal; and in this transactionalist 
game of attempting to use each other the LTTE eventually bested 
Premadasa.lxxxix
    On both other occasions the Colombo-government’s peace moves 
emerged in the course of electoral campaigns pitting the principal parties, 
the United National Party (incumbent in 1994) and the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (incumbent in 2001). On both occasions the LTTE favoured the 
oppositional candidate and on the first occasion facilitated the victory of 
Chandrika Kumaratunga by eliminating the other Presidential candidate, 
Gamini Dissanayake, on October 24 1995 through the deployment of a 
female suicide bomber who killed 55 others in the process. Though a suicide 
attack was of some import here, Kumaratunga had participated with her 
husbandxc in the peace overtures of 1987 and her politics were of a demi-
socialist cum liberal kind. Her party had already adopted a manifesto 
advocating a peaceful solution to the ongoing struggle and was campaigning 
vigorously towards this end. It was this bold policy on her part (going 
against the populist Sinhala grain) that led to peace negotiations after her 
electoral triumph.xci Likewise, Ranil Wickremasinghe, as leader of the UNP, 
ran on a platform for peace during the parliamentary elections in late 2001 
and secretly brokered a ceasefire arrangement (subsequently ratified) prior 
to the elections.xcii  
     These notes provide only the bare bones of each story, but they convey 
what any person-on-street in Sri Lanka would have told an investigator. The 
summary is sufficient to indicate that each moment of seeming compromise 
was preceded by a complex turn of events and relationships. In sum, they 
also indicate how the democratic process within the southern half of the 
equation was so central to such developments. To attribute such outcomes to 
SMs is simply simpleton.  
     Other scholars have deciphered the fact that the SMs of the LTTE have 
been a minute part of their operational tactics – statistically speaking. 
Hopgood has intelligently worked out a way of revealing that many SMs 
have taken place at sea. It is for this reason that he could correctly assert that 
the majority of attacks “have involved military objectives in the north and 
east.”xciii But it is quite incorrect to go one step further and state that “there 
are no clear examples of civilians being directly targeted by SMs.”xciv  
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Figure 13 
LTTE MASSACRES. Carnage from an LTTE  
bomb on a railway carriage in Colombo. From  
images included in a website article by Shantha Hennayake.  
In any event such computations underestimate the significance of SMs in 
the Sri Lankan context. Taking out a civilian Rommel has a more 
deleterious effect than a sinking of fast attack boat.xcv Likewise the battles at 
sea are unseen and have little ripple effect (pun intended). In contrast, an 
assassination by suicide bomber in the heart of Colombo or a big strike, like 
the attacks on the Central Bank and World Trade Centre in Colombo, had 
the capacity to instill fear and create havoc within a big city. 
     Thus, SMs have indeed been an important facet of the LTTE operations 
not only as a weapon in beleaguered context, but as precision strike that 
decapitates key leaders at moments of import for the LTTE’s political 
objectives. It is the timing of so many such ‘decapitations’ of capable 
leaders by the LTTE that will encourage a student of Clausewitz to purr 
with satisfaction. That is why they continue to use the method even after the 
war situation reached what has been called a “hurting stalemate” by 2001 if 
not earlier.xcvi
     For all that the general thrust of the arguments by Hopgood and 
Gambetta are valid. Firstly, the Black Tigers are elite warriors of the 
commando type and their selfless commitment is ‘merely’ a few degrees 
above the expectations attached to most LTTE fighters. This expectation 
extends to their leaders. Referring to what they call “terrorist organizations,” 
scholars have essayed the global generalisation that “they rarely supply 
suicide bombers from their own ranks;” and that a leader has not 
volunteered for a martyrdom operation.xcvii For the LTTE both statements 
are simply not valid. Kittu, Pulendran, Kumārappa and Sivarāsan are among 
top-rung officers who have killed themselves when required to do so. In the 
second place, Hopgood and Gambetta have correctly argued that for the 
LTTE the SMS are just one element in their arsenal and that the military 
achievements of the LTTE have been built on many pillars, including 
conventional forces. Their awareness, therefore, is in contrast to that of 
Pape. 
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     At no time does Pape foreground the fact that, after the Indians left in 
February/March 1990, the LTTE established a de facto state dominating 
much of the Tamil-speaking territory within Sri Lanka. Moreover, no survey 
of the LTTE’s success can afford to downplay the fact that it quickly 
became a conventional army with guerrilla extensions in certain areas. 
Between 1990 and 2001 the LTTE secured massive victories against the Sri 
Lankan state forces, notably at Pooneryn (November 1993), Mullaitivu (July 
1996), Puliyankulam and Kanakarayankulam (September 1999), Elephant 
Pass (April 2000) and in response to the army’s ‘Agni Kheela’ offensive in 
April 2001.xcviii Though outgunned and outnumbered, they used to 
advantage the state’s foolhardiness in fighting in fixed positions on 
numerous fronts by relying on mobility, the tactical concentration of limited 
resources and superior-intelligence about their opponent’s dispositions. 
     From early days, moreover, the LTTE developed a brown-water navy of 
speedboats that used the long sub-continental coastlines to advantage – 
perhaps the only modern liberation force to develop such a capacity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 14 
  NAVAL UNIT. 
http://www.eelamweb.com/cgibin/i
mage/imageFolio.cgi?action=view
&link=Tigers_Operations/Unceasing_Waves-
3&image=6b.jpg&img=&tt=img 
 
Their naval weaponry have included 30 ft “ship-killer” speedboats, 17 metre 
speedboats and specially designed low-profile “stealth boats” that can 
operate close inshore and within inland waters. Purchasing a fleet of 
freighters that sailed convenient “pan-ho-lib” (Panama-Honduras-Liberia) 
flags, they have also developed a shipping network that functions as a 
legitimate business, while also bringing them arms when feasible. They also 
have an embryonic air force that has aroused widespread a concerns in 
many quarters, especially after two propeller-driven planes made a 
spectacular, if manifestly symbolic, night raid on the government’s 
Katunayake airbase on 26 March 2007.xcix
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 Figure 15 
LTTE AIR TIGER WING, late March 2007, Courtesy of TamilNet, 26 
March 2007 
These pictures were released by the LTTE immediately after the first air 
strike on Katunayake airbase. These propeller-driven planes hit some oil 
instalations afew days later. The initial blurb reads thus: “Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have for the first time released photos of their Air-
Tigers to media with Tamileelam Air Force (TAF) first major mission. 
While reputed military analysts speculated on the LTTE use of air-craft 
limited to self-destroy missions, Tigers have surprised them by using locally 
designed payload carrying mechanisms, and automatic ammunition 
discharge circuitry, and demonstrated capability to fly night missions.  
Liberation Tigers credit the formation of the Tiger air-wing (Vaanpuligal) to 
Colonel Shankar alias Vythialingam Sornalingam, an old boy of Hartley College, 
Point Pedro. He was an aeronautical engineer with Air Canada, with an 
Engineering Degree in Aeronautics from Hindustan Engineering College in Tamil 
Nadu. Shankar was the chief of the 'Air Tigers' and was responsible for developing 
the air wing from its infancy until his assassination in December 2001.”  
 
Organisational Capacities 
As the evidence marshaled above indicates, one word sums up the LTTE’s 
success and reach: “organisation.” This has been seconded by long-term 
foresight, contingency planning and an aggressive proclivity towards pre-
emptive strikes. Within Sri Lanka, for instance, their key personnel have 
been protected since the late 1980s through extensive underground facilities, 
while state-of-the art, underground hospitals have serviced their 
rehabilitation needs. From the mid-1980s, as indicated, they grew into a 
transnational corporation with numerous subsidiary enterprises, some 
criminal and clandestine, as well as affiliated front organisations. As one 
militant told Davis, Pirapāharan “thought like a good merchant capitalist.”c 
This multinational corporation has three dimensions: fundraising, arms 
procurement, and publicity. Gerald Peiris sums it all up: the “LTTE has 
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established over the years a massive empire of business and commerce with 
a global spread for which the Eelam war provides the motive force.”ci
     The organisational capacities extended to the manner in which the LTTE 
cemented bonds among it cadre and mobilised support among the Tamil 
peoples in Sri Lanka, while serving the legitimisation of their cause in a 
context where they had initially to compete with, and outbid, other militant 
Tamil forces. Inspired both by his emotional bonds with peers who died in 
the fight as well as instrumental goals, from the very outset Pirapāharan 
initiated what one can call, after Katherine Verdery’s work, “dead body 
politics.”cii From the time when Seelan and Sellakili died in the Jaffna 
locality in July 1983 till July 1987, the bodies of the fallen Tigers were 
paraded through the streets, sometimes furtively at night, in order to whip 
up emotional fervour and anger.ciii
     This procedure was less feasible when the LTTE took on the might of the 
Indian army in the period October 1987-late 1989. When the Indian 
government decided to withdraw its forces and a ceasefire came into place, 
“around six hundred LTTE cadres assembled at a secret venue in the 
Mullaitheevu district jungles of Nithikaikulam” on 27 November 1989 – the 
day on which the first Tiger fighter, Shankar, a childhood friend of 
Pirapāharan died -- to commemorate what they call Māvīrar Nāl or Great 
Heroes Day.civ  
 Figure 16 
Emblematic LTTE Flag with Shankar.  
Courtesy of http://www.eelamweb.com 
Shankar, code name for S. Sathianathan of Kamparmalai,  Vadamarachchi, was a 
close friend of Pirapaharan and a senior commander in the small band of 
revolutionary nationalists when he was severely wounded in a police raid in 
October 1982. Smuggled into India he died at Madurai on 27 November 1982 and 
his moment of death has been the central point of the LTTE’s māvīrar Nāl 
(Heroes’ Week)commemoration since 1989. 
 
     Around the same time, 1989-90 the LTTE initiated a momentous 
innovation: where their fallen had previously been provided with rites 
appropriate to their religious background, Christian burial or Hindu 
cremation as the case may be, they decided that they had a primary lien on 
the bodies and that all should be buried. Ancient Indian practices associated 
with sannyāsin, sati and heroic figures, who were buried and given 
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memorial stones known as natukal, were deployed to render this 
transformation acceptable to the Hindu majority in Sri Lanka.cv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 17 
 LTTE imports the         
Natukal Concept from    
India Courtesy of 
TamilNet.com 
LTTE's Vavuniya Political head Mr.S.Elilan is seen garlanding Black Tiger 
Lt. Col. Bork's "Nadukal" at the Eachchankulam Maveerar Thuyilum Illam. 
Lt. Col. Bork (Mapanapillai Arasaratnam of Arumuhathan Puthukulam 
Vavuniya) was killed on 23.11.1990 when he helped destroy the entrance to 
strategic Mankulam SLA camp. (www.TamilNet.com). This picture was 
displayed on 5 July 2003, the day when the LTTE formally pays homage to 
the Black Tiger māvīrar who have died in their cause. 
    The term natukal (also nadukal) literally means “planted stones” and are 
memorial stones for heroic figures and/or victims of unjust humiliation, 
some of whom have committed protest suicide to mark a severe 
transgression. In southern India some of these deified humans have become 
shrines and part of the cluster of “fierce deities” dispensing benefits to 
supplicants seeking retribution or succour. 
    The LTTE’s introduction of the venerated Indian concept of natukal as 
“hero stone” was one facet of an intricate cultural operation to bolster 
the switch from cremation of their Hindu dead to burial.  
 
 Thus we see the emergence of tuyilam illam, or resting places that are 
considered “holy ground” and “temples.”cvi
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Figure 18 
TUYILAM ILLAM AT KOPAY near Jaffna Town, November 2004. 
Picture by Michael Roberts 
This is one of the largest “resting places” in Tamil-majority regions in Sri 
Lanka. Kopay was within an area under government control in 2004. This 
picture displays the preparations for the big Māvīrar Nāl of 27 November 
2004. All the thuyilam illam of the LTTE are kept in immaculate condition 
by a separate department established for such activities in the early 1990s. 
The Kopay site was under LTTE control from mid-1990 to late 1995 but was 
bulldozed by the army when the Jaffna Peninsula was captured and the 
LTTE withdrew its forces after initial resistance in order to conserve its 
resources and overstretch the government forces.  
 
     These are LTTE sites supervised meticulously by a special department 
set up for the purpose. Thus, from 1989 one sees a process of 
institutionalisation that consolidated the commemoration of the dead. This 
was a mode of propaganda by deed and death, to repeat, “dead body 
politics” in Verdery’s striking phrase. By the 2000s there were 21 major 
tuyilam illam at which commemorative rituals occured simultaneously on 27 
November each year.  
That day is preceded by a week of intense activity marked by the multi-
media modalities of loud music, buntings, billboards, pandals and 
decorations in the LTTE colours of red and gold; while strategically sited 
sheds display pictures of the fallen from the surrounding locality. Since 
kinsfolk travel to where their dead lie for the apical momnet at twilight on 
the 27th November, the whole operation is a massive logistical exercise that 
is impeccably organised.cvii .At the climactic moment at 6.06 pm on the 27th 
November one could say that a community of suffering is engendered 
among the Tamil populace. The lamentation, however, is gilded by pride 
and a celebration of worth. 
     The 21 tuyilam illam are supplemented by permanent cenotaphs 
commemorating major victories or the death of a stellar māvīrar at diverse 
locations. 
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 Figure 19 
KITTU COMMEMORATED in Picturesque Mode. Picture by Michael 
Roberts, November 2004 
Kittu, otherwise Sathasivam Krishnakumar, was a charismatic LTTE leader 
who committed who went down with an LTTE arms ship when it was 
scuttled on his command a when cornered by the Indian Navy in 1993. a 
statue was built at this site in theJaffna Peninsula; but it was knocked down 
by army personnel when the areas was re-captured. The ‘remains’ of the 
statue lay beside this commemorative replacement when I visited the spot in 
November 2004. 
 
 In sum, therefore, a sacred topography has been created in the Tamil-
majority regions. Furthermore, there are nine other commemorative days 
recognising key figures in the LTTE firmament of the dead, such as Miller, 
Tilīpan, Annai Pupati, and Kittu, so that the pro-LTTE universe has a 
temporal calendar to match its spatial symbolism. 
     The Māvīirar Nāl commemorations are also organised in many large 
cities throughout by the clusters of Tamil migrants who are part of the 
LTTE network.  
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 Figure 20 
One of the Billboards at the Māvīrar Nāl Commemoration at Chicago 
in late November 2004. Courtesy of TamilNet.com via a Tamil friend 
 
 
  
Figure 21 
The Hall prepared for the Māvīrar Nāl Commemoration at Sydney in 
late November 2004 
Courtesy of TamilNet.com via a Tamil friend.
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Figure 22 
KARTHIGAI IN VARIED STYLES 
The four pictures of the gloriosa superba or glory lily have been taken from 
an internet source. The image on top is from an LTTE pageant held in some 
city in Germany during the commemoration of Māvīrar Day one November 
in the early 21st century (kindly located for me from cyber-world 
presentations by pro-LTTE sources by a Tamil friend who did not supply 
details). The glory lily is called karthigai or kaantal in Tamil and niyangala 
in Sinhala. It is one of the flowers highlighted in Cankam poetry (see X. S. 
Thaninayagam, Landscape and Poetry. A Study of Nature in Classical 
Poetry. 2nd edn. London: Asia Publishing House.1966, pp. 30, 57, 104). Also 
see www.TamilNet.com, 14 April 2004, for a clarification for why this flower 
was chosen as the national emblem of the LTTE. An artistic form of this 
emblem has since been incorporated as the logo for the TV network launched 
by the LTTE in early 2005. 
 
Modern technology provided by DVDs, audio links, internet and television 
further consolidate the resonant images associated with the fallen brave 
among those who are attuned to the cause of Eelam in general and to the 
Tigers in particular – so that the networks of ‘LTTE Incorporated’ are 
metaphorically lubricated by tears and pride. 
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     The embellishments associated with the LTTE’s commemorative 
propaganda is permeated powerfully by its own colours, red and yellow 
(gold), colours that happen to be the favoured hues of Hinduism. 
 
 Figure 23 
GARLANDED GRAVESTONES AT A TUYILAM ILLAM,  I.E. “RESTING 
PLACE” IN BATTICALOA DISTRICT 
This image too was located for me by a Tamil friend and I have no details re 
time and place. The red and gold (yellow) colour schemes for buntings, 
shades and other décor is conventional for most LTTE rites and assemblies; 
and carry a warm familiarity and perhaps even a Hindu Saivite religious 
ambience. 
 
 Figure 24 
Martyr’s Hall at School Site in Batticaloa, November 2004. Courtesy of 
TamilNet.com
There were pictures of 2500 LTTE dead depicted on the walls. The 
overwhelming ‘tapestry’ of lights (imitative of arati perhaps) and the 
equally overwhelming colour scheme of red and gold produce an ambience 
of Hindu religious dispensations. 
 
 
This Hindu colouring is further deepened by one of the central themes in the 
poetry and perorations around the fallen: namely, the metaphor of the dead 
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as seeds or bodies whose ashes will provide the basis of new life.cviii While 
this motif is a fundamental aspect of Hinduism, it is also imagery that can 
appeal to Christians.  
     At some point around 2000/01 the mobilisation-cum-indoctrination work 
of the LTTE was augmented further by cultural pageants described as 
Pongu Thamil, translated officially as “resurgent Tamil,” that were 
conducted on an ad hoc basis in various parts of Sri Lanka as well as abroad  
Pongu (ponku) is a highly evocative word in Tamil and refers to a 
ceremonial pot of rice gruel that signifies “rising up, boiling over, swelling, 
emergent.”  
 Figure 25 
Pongu Thamil Festival at Geneva, 2003. Courtesy of TamiNet.com via a 
Tamil friend 
 
 
 Figure 26 
PIRAPĀHARAN  FLOAT  AT  PONGU THAMIL PAGEANT HELD 
AT GENEVA.  
Courtesy of TamiNet.com 
 
At kotai (festivals) it signals auspiciousness and abundance of fruits.cix 
Metaphorically it can also mean rising anger.cx In this multivalent manner, 
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therefore, the pot symbol highlights the image of potency and thus the 
principle of sakti (energy, primordial potency) that is so central to 
Hinduism.cxi
       Figure 27 
BODIES THAT FIGHT ON. Courtesy of Vaitheespara Ravindiran 
          
This “memorial tomb” is a specific act of “veneration” for the 398 Tiger 
fighters who “attained martyrdom” during a 3-day operation directed by 
Prabhākaran himself and known as “Unceasing Waves” that “liberated the 
territory of Kilinochchi from the Sri Lankan military that occupied the 
Tamil homeland.” This cenotaph is located along the A9 road to Jaffna at 
Kilinochchi, administrative capital of the LTTE and was unveiled on 27 
November 2004.. The inscription is in English and the words quoted above 
are from this representation. Note the embellishment provided by flame-like 
stalks of the karthigai (glory lily) cradling the fallen māvīrar in the manner 
of a lotus base. 
 
Set within this cultural context, therefore, it is extremely significant that 
Māvīrar Nāl, or Heroes’ Week, has also been referred to as an elucci nāl, 
that is, a “Day of Edification” or “Day of Rising.”cxii Elucci (also written as 
ezucci) is another evocative word: it is “the nominalisation of the verbal root 
‘elu’, which means rise up, get up, get up out of bed – (a word) that is 
reflexive, that is, to raise oneself up, to get oneself up, rather than to lift up 
something else (so that it mars) independence and self-sufficiency.”cxiii. It 
appears to carry a multivalent richness in Tamil-speak – for a dictionary 
indicates its meanings as “ascent, elevation, staring as in a 
procession, derivatively song sung at dawn to raise the god, king or VIP 
from sleep, origin, birth appearance, beginning, oatitis, inflammation of the 
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ear, effort, activity.”cxiv When this aspect of LTTE symbolism is placed 
alongside the various Saivite practices around the tombstones and enlivened 
photographs of the dead,cxv the motifs of renewal and redemption in LTTE 
conversation and poetrycxvi as well as the imagery of ashes and seed 
identified earlier, one has a cluster of ideas that enable Tiger and pro-Tiger 
participants to envision a better life in the hereafter. I speak here of 
“enabling capacity” in the sense of “conditions of possibility.” The 
iconography of an imaginative memorial paying homage to the LTTE 
soldiers who died in re-capturing Kilinochchi (presently the administrative 
capital of their de facto state) captures this line of thought insofar as it led 
Vaitheespara Ravindiran to describe it as an evocation of resurrection and 
encouraged me to label it “Bodies That Fight On”. 
 
Punchline Conclusions 
Given such cultural ingredients and themes in the considerable work of 
indoctrination, propaganda and legitimisation pursued by the LTTE, the 
facile manner in which Robert Pape and so many other scholars present the 
LTTE as “secular” seems quite erroneous. It is, furthermore, a measure of 
Pape’s tunnel-enclosure within the fantastic world of “suicide terrorism” 
that he attributes the LTTE’s military and political successes 
overwhelmingly to one factor, suicidal attackers. This is to render a 
contributory weapon into a major cause, figuratively rendering a mortar into 
an IBM. 
 
 
                                                 
i This idea is embodied in a new concept coined by the LTTE, namely 
uyirāyutam (also written as uyirāyutham), which literally means “life as 
weapon” (see A. J. V. Chandrakanthan, ‘Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside 
View’, in A. J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. Its Origins and 
Development in the 19th and 20th centuries (London: Hurst and Company, 
2000) p.164; Peter Schalk, ‘Beyond Hindu Festivals: the Celebration of Great 
Heroes’ Day by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Europe’, in 
Martin Baumann et al (eds.) Tempel und Tamilien in Zweiter Heimat (Ergon 
Verlag, 2003, p. 395). As clarified by Chandrakanthan, this concept refers to a 
person who has presented his/her life as that-kodai or self-gift. That-kodai, or 
more correctly tar-kodai, seems to be a clever and innovative linking of the 
word tan (self) with kotai (kodai) meaning “gift.” On this whole issue see 
especially Schalk, ibid as well as his ‘Resistance and Martyrdom in the 
Process of State Formation of Tamililam’, in Joyce Pettigrew (ed.) Martyrdom 
and Political Resistance (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997) pp.61-84 
and ‘The Revival of Martyr Cults among Ilavar’, Temenos: Studies in 
Comparative Religion 33 (1997) pp.151-190, available at 
http://www.tamilcanadian.com/cgi-bin/php/page.php?index=307. 
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ii The origins of the LTTE are shrouded in mystery, though it is 
conventionally said that the name was adopted in May 1976 and that young 
Prabhakaran was its principal architect (M. R. Narayan Swamy, Inside an 
Elusive Mind. Prabhakaran (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications 2004) 
pp.34, 36-37. Conclusive details provided by T. Sabaratnam indicate that 
the LTTE was an offspring of a group called the Tamil New Tigers (led by 
Chetti Thanabalasingham and/or Pirapāharan) that had been formed around 
1972 (see text below & footnote 00).  
 
iii Details from M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Sri Lanka, (Delhi: Konark 
Publishers Pvt Ltd. 1994) p.29, my conversations with VIS Jayapalan; and 
Sabaratnam 2003 et seq, chap. 7: ‘The Cyanide Suicide’. See Roberts ‘Filial 
Devotion and the Tiger Cult of Suicide’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 
30 (1996) pp.252-54 & 261-62 for an earlier account. 
 
iv Narayan Swamy, Tigers (note 3) p.29 and Roberts, Filial Devotion (note 
3) pp.252-54. 
 
v Roberts, ‘ “I Shall Have You Slippered”: The General and the Particular in 
an Historical Conjuncture’, Social Analysis 17 (1985) pp.17-48.  
 
vi The flier depicting Sivakumaran with kingly headress and sword on 
rearing horse in the manner of Kattabomman was kindly supplied by S. 
Visahan of the Tamil Information Centre in London (also once a class mate 
of Sivakumaran’s). For the statue, see picture by Raghubir Singh in the 
National Geographic, 1979, p.138. Also see Schalk, ‘Historization of the 
Martial Ideology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)’, South 
Asia 20/2 (1997) p.61; M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers (note 3) p.46n4 and 
M. Roberts, Filial Devotion (note 3) p.254. Note that the statue of the old 
Tamil stalwart, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, was also knocked down by 
army personnel. Subsequently, statues of ancient, revered Tamil poets as 
well as Gandhi were also disfigured. 
 
vii Sivakumaran has subsequently been incorporated into the pantheon of 
māvīrar. I have in my possession a poster picture where his photograph sits 
beside Tilīpan, Annai Pupati, Miller, Kittu and other stars in the LTTE 
firmament. 
 
viii Schalk, Resistance (note 1) p.64, Narayan Swamy, Elusive (note 2) 
pp.109, 201-02. Also see the clarifications provided by Pirapāhran himself 
and Yogi in 1991 within the BBC documentary enteled “Suicide Killers” 
presented in their Inside Story series. 
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ix Schalk, Hindu Festivals (note 1) p.396. No figures are presented. Note 
that by November 2006 the figure for LTTE dead was said to be 18,742 
(Jeyaraj 2006). 
 
x Schalk, Resistance (note 1) p. 75, translation from Māvīraarkurippettu 
vol.1/10. 
 
xi Information from a former Tiger fighter. I did not seek further details in 
part because the moment was not opportune, but also because it seemed, for 
me, such a logical move with great military advantages. 
 
xii Two trucks set out on the Nelliyadi mission, but one got bogged down in 
sand (personal communication from an ex-Tiger fighter of the mid-1980s). 
Miller is the nom de guerre for Vallipuram Vasanthan and was the son of a 
bank clerk from the vicinity of Point Pedro. 
  
xiii As contended by Hoffman and McCormick on the basis of interviews 
with captured LTTE personnel (Bruce Hoffman, & G. H. McCormick, 
‘Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack’, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 27 (2004) p.459). The first Hezbollah attack was on the Iraqi 
embassy in Beirut (27 killed and over 100 wounded) in December 1981, but 
the two most dramatic affairs were the bombing of the US embassy in 
Beirut in April and the truck bomb of October 1983 which killed 243 
American servicemen. 
 
xiv This is precisely what Robert Pape does. Indeed, in his debate with 
Bloom and Reuter on the issue of competitive outbidding, the date of 
Miller’s suicide operation is treated as a critical point: “Before the Sri 
Lankan military began moving into the Tamil homelands of the island in 
1987, the Tamil Tigers did not use suicide attacks” (Dying to Win: The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House. 2005, p.+++).  
 
xv Kurt W. Treptow, “The Winter of Despair: Jan Palach and the Collapse of 
the Prague Spring,” in Treptow, From Zalmoxis to Jan Palach. Studies in 
East European History, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992, pp. 
117-36.  
 
xvi See Michael Briggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Self-immolations, 1962-
2002’, in D. Gambetta (ed.) Making Sense of Suicide Missions (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
xvii My partial understandings of this event have been enabled by 
descriptions from two individuals who were present, Thiru Master and Mrs 
Pushpa Selvanayagam, whose house is some 200 yards from the site of the 
fast. 
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xviii It was Ravindiran Vaitheespara who first brought this facet to my 
attention through his evaluation of the intense responses among Tamils in 
Canada in the course of stressing the significance of Thilīpan’s act in the 
history of the LTTE and Tamil struggle. 
 
xix Roberts, ‘Saivite Symbolism, Sacrifice and Tamil Tiger Rites’, Social 
Analysis 49/1 (2005) pp.67-93 and Roberts, ‘Pragmatic Action and 
Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration’, Social Analysis 
50/1 (2006) pp.73-102.  
 
xx Sumathi Ramaswamy, Passions of the Tongue (Princeton University Press, 
1997) pp.1-2, 4, 8-11, 62, 231-32. For ancient and medieval south India, see 
K. Kailasapathy, Tamil Heroic Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1968), Dennis Hudson, ‘Violent and Fanatical Devotion among the Nayanars: 
A Study in the Periya Purānam of Cekkilār’, in A. Hiltebeitel (ed.) Criminal 
Gods and Demon Devotees (Delhi: Manohar, 1990) pp.373-405, and David D. 
Shulman, Tamil Temple Myths. Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South 
Indian Saiva Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 
Shulman, ‘Bandits and Other Tragic Heroes’, in Shulman, The King and the 
Clown in South Indian Myth (Princeton University Press, 1985) pp.340-79 and 
Shulman, The Hungry God. Hindu Tales of Filicide and Devotion (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993).  
 
xxi Roberts, Filial Devotion (note 3) pp.262-63. 
 
xxii For summary see M. Roberts, ‘Tamil Tiger ‘Martyrs’: Regenerating 
Divine Potency’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005) pp. 500-03; but 
it would be more advantageous to consult the detailed texts that I have relied 
on, for e. g. M. Tanaka, Patrons, Devotees and Goddesses. Ritual and 
Power among the Tamil Fishermen of Sri Lanka (Kyoto: Institute for 
Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, 1991) and Rohan Bastin, 
‘Sorcerous Technologies and Religious Innovation in Sri Lanka’, Social 
Analysis 46 (2002) pp.155-74 and Rohan Bastin, The Domain of Constant 
Excess: Religious Pluralism at the Munnesvaram Temples, Sri Lanka (New 
York: Berghahn, 2002). For South India, see D. Mines, Fierce Gods. 
Inequality, Ritual and the Politics of Desire in a South Indian Village 
(Indiana University Press, 2005).  
 
xxiii Tanaka, ibid., pp.93-94. 
 
xxiv Bastin, Domain (note 22) p.68. 
 
xxv Bastin, Domain (note 22) pp.198-99. Also see Tanaka, (note 22) p.228. 
 
xxvi Shulman, Temple Myths (note 20) pp.90-91 and Bandits (note 20) p.343. 
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xxvii Shulman, Temple Myths (note 20) pp. 45-46, 64-65. 
 
xxviii For e.g. Stephen Holmes, ‘Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001’, in D. 
Gambetta (ed.) Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) p.147; Jon Elster, ‘Motivations and Beliefs in 
Suicide Missions’, in D. Gambetta (ed.) Ibid, p.253; Diego Gambetta, ‘Can 
We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?’ in Ibid, pp.261-63; and Schalk (note 
1) p.68.  
 
xxix This is a common sense point and hardly original, though it is precisely 
the form of reasoning which is undervalued in Pape’s analysis. Cf. “Of 
importance … is a cultural frame that recognizes and values the principle of 
self-sacrifice in the defense of one’s community” (Hoffman &. McCormick 
(note 13) p.255). 
 
xxx On receiving the first draft of this article, Donald Horowitz remarked that 
Pape represents a school of thought in America which believes that culture 
and history are of little relevance for such contemporary studies (email note, 
mid 2006). 
 
xxxi Regarding TamilNet and its key editor till recently, Dhamaretnam 
Sivaram alias Taraki, see Mark Whitaker, ‘Tamilnet.com: Some Reflections 
on Popular Anthropology, Nationalism, and the Internet’, Anthropological 
Quarterly 77 (2004) pp.469-98; and Maya Ranganathan, ‘Nurturing a 
Nation on the Net: The Case of Tamil Eelam’, Nationalism & Ethnic 
Politics 8 (2002) pp.51-66. In line with Ranganathan I do not accept 
Whitaker’s characterisation of TamilNet as neutral. It may not be run by the 
LTTE, but its partialities are clear and what is not said is as significant as 
the reportage.  
 
xxxii In contrast to Pape, Mia Bloom visited Sri Lanka and spent several 
months on her researches, even conducting a questionnaire session in the 
lands controlled directly by the LTTE (Bloom, ‘In the Tiger’s Belly’, 
http://www. worldpress.org/Asia/1015.cfm, inserted in 2003 and Bloom, 
Dying to Kill. The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2005) pp.67-68.  
 
xxxiii C. R. De Silva, Sri Lanka. A History, 2nd revd. edn. (Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing. 1997) p.27. C. R. de Silva’s specialist skills do not embrace the 
ancient period, but he has shown himself to be an impeccable scholar and this 
must be viewed as a summary of the specialist information available at the 
time at which his book was drafted. 
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xxxiv Note what K. M. de Silva, also, like me, no specialist, has to say in his 
early general history: “By the second century AD Sinhalese was being used 
for literary purposes… The Sinhalese language was also enriched by 
translations from Pāli … [and] Sanskrit … There was also a considerable 
Tamil influence on the vocabulary, idiom and grammatical structure of 
Sinhalese” (A History of Sri Lanka, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981, 
p.58). 
 
xxxv Note the implications of the literary review by a non-partisan scholar, 
Charles Hallisey, ‘Works and Persons in Sinhalese Literary Culture’, in S 
Pollock (ed.) Literary Cultures in History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003) pp.695-96, 707ff & 721ff. The Sigiri graffiti of the 
seventh to ninth centuries are particularly significant in this regard when 
they are associated with (a) a key statement, a kind of brief review, in the 
Dhampiyā Atuvā Gätapādaya of the tenth century CE (after taking RALH 
Gunawardana’s translation -- in his booklet, Historiography in a Time of 
Ethnic Conflict. Construction of the Past in Contemporary Lanka, Colombo: 
Social Scientists’ Association, 1995, pp.41-42 -- rather than Dharmadasa’s 
version as my yardstick) and (b) Buddhaghosa’s comment about the 
language of the people in the fifth century CE. In brief, proto-Sinhala-
becoming-Sinhala appears to have been the most widespread speech form 
for much of the first millennium CE. The recent book by K. Indrapala, 
namely, The Evolution of an Ethnic Identity. The Tamils in Sri Lanka. circa 
300 BCE to circa 1200 CE (Sydney: South Asian Studies Centre, 2005) 
does not undermine this verdict, despite its convolutions.  
 
xxxvi For clarification of the details and the concept of “tributary 
overlordship,” see Roberts, Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period, 
1590s-1815 (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, Publications, 2004) chaps. 3, 4 & 5. 
For the concept “galactic polity,” see S. J. Tambiah, Culture, Thought and 
Social Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) chap 7 and 
Buddhism Betrayed? (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992) pp. 173-
76. 
 
xxxvii Regarding Colombo’s metropolitian hegemony from the 1850s to the 
1970s, see Roberts et al, People Inbetween (Ratmalana: Sarvodaya 
Publications, 1989) chap. 6??. 
 
xxxviii Tamil political leaders operating in English in the period 1918 to 1948 
generally referred to their people as a “community” – that is, there was no 
consistent definition of themselves as a “nation.” In contrast there were a 
few Sinhala ideologues who used the term “nation” in English, while the use 
of the Sinhala word jātiya in both the sense of “nation” and “race’” was 
widespread in Sinhala journalese and pamphleteering. However, the factions 
espousing Sinhala and Tamil political interests, such as “communal 
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electorates,” were roundly castigated by the political leaders attached to the 
concept “Ceylonese.” They were called “communalists” – a pejorative word 
in the South Asian political lexicon. See Roberts, ‘Nationalisms Today and 
Yesterday’, in Gerald Peiris and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe (eds) History 
and Politics. Millennial Perspectives. Essays in Honour of Kingsley de Silva 
(Colombo: Law and Society Trust, 1998) pp. 3-44, and Roberts, ‘Stimulants 
and Ingredients in the Awakening of Latter-day Nationalism’, in Roberts 
(ed.) Sri Lanka. Collective Identities Revisited (Colombo: Marga Institute, 
1997) pp.267-92.  
 
xxxix A. J. Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan 
Tamil Nationalism, 1948-1977 (London: Hurst & Company, 1994) pp.108-
09. 
 
xl See Wilson, Ibid, passim;‘The Tamil Federal Party in Ceylon Politics’, 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 4 (1966) pp.117-31; Wilson, 
Electoral Politics in an Emergent State. The Ceylon General Elections, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Roberts, ‘1970 and 
Thereabout in Sri Lanka: The Politics of a General Election’, South Asia 1 
(1978) pp.90-101.  
 
xli This argument is spelt out in Michael Roberts, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka 
and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to Accommodation’, Modern Asian 
Studies 12 (1978) pp.353-76. But also see Wilson, Electoral Politics (note 
40); L. Sabaratnam, Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and 
Cultural Continuity (London: Palgrave, 2001) p.197 and B. O’Duffy, ‘LTTE: 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Majoritarianism, Self-Determination, and 
Military-to-Political Transition in Sri Lanka’, in               2007) pp. 258-59. 
 
xlii Information from Neville Jayaweera (ex-CCS), my personal grapevine 
knowledge as well as Vijaya Samaraweera, ‘The Role of the Bureaucracy’, 
Ceylon Journal of Historical & Social Studies n.s. 4 (1974) pp. 37-40. 
 
xliii This issue is too complex to summarise in a few words. The Tamil 
grievances are premised on the idea that the boundaries of the Eastern 
Province established by the British in the nineteenth century were their 
‘traditional homelands,’ when in fact their settlements in the early twentieth 
century were for the most part confined to the littoral stretches – the 
hinterlands being sparsely peopled and for the most part Sinhala except in 
the southern reaches of the Eastern Province where the majority were 
Muslim Moors. See G. H. Peiris, ‘An appraisal of the concept of a 
traditional homeland’, Ethnic Studies Report 9 (1991) pp.13-39 and 
‘Irrigation, land distribution and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: an evaluation 
of criticisms with special reference to the Mahaveli programme’, Ethnic 
Studies Report 12 (1994) pp.43-88. Cf. Roberts, ‘Narrating Tamil 
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Nationalism: Subjectivities and Issues’, South Asia 28 (2004) pp. 102-08 
and L. Sabaratnam (note 41) pp.196, 206-07. 
 
xliv C. R. de Silva, ‘The Impact of Nationalism on Education: The Schools 
Takeover (1961) and the University Admissions Crisis, 1970-75’, in M 
Roberts (ed.) Collective Identities, Nationalisms, and Protest in Modern Sri 
Lanka (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1979) pp.474-99.  
 
xlv This is a bald summary. As such it is hardly comprehensive. It does not 
engage the degree to which Tamil politicians may have contributed to the 
widening gulf through extremist actions and outrageous demands. For one 
example of virulence, see Neville Jayaweera, “Some Memories of My 
Years in Jaffna, Part I,” Ceylankan, Nov. 2006, No. 36, p. 4. This is not the 
place to pursue such gaps in our historical knowledge. 
 
xlvi T. Sabaratnam, Pirapāharan, chap. 6: ‘Birth of the New Tigers’ in 
http://www.sangam.org/ and last two names from D. Sivaram (interview 26 
October 2004). Chetti turned police informant in the mid-1970s and was 
killed by Kuttimani and Pirapāharan while visiting a liquor shop 
(information from Varadakumar of the TIC, London). 
 
xlvii Hoffman & McCormick, (note 13) pp.257-58. For confirmation, see T 
Sabaratnam ibid. chap. MM ++ 
 
xlviii Sabaratnam, 2003 et seq, ol II, chap. 12-14. Chelvanayakam, or 
‘Thanthai Chelva’ as he was reverentially known, died on 27 April 1977 and 
Amirthalingam became the leader of the TULF. In 1981 the LTTE had a 
dual leadership structure with Uma Maheswaran (of Vellalar caste) as 
political chief and Pirapāharan as military chief. Both opposed the TULF 
policy. Later the two fell out – virulently to the point of gunfights at 
‘Chennai coral’. 
 
xlix Personal communications from S. Sivadasan (a retired senior Tamil 
administrator) and K. Sivathamby during interviews in August 2005. 
 
l Mahattayā (1956-1994) was also from the Karaiyar caste, but from a much 
poorer family than Pirapāharan, though there is a suggestion that they were 
cousins (Wikipedia; see below). Grapevine information indicates that his 
cartographical sense was a significant asset in the guerilla stage of the LTTE 
insurgency. In the 1990s there was a falling out between the two leaders. 
LTTE propaganda alleges that he became too close to RAW, the Indian 
version of CIA; but there is also a theory that he “was suspected of setting 
himself as a rival to the LTTE founder” (from http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Mahattaya, accessed 5 Dec. 2006). 
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li Personal communication from S. Rajanayagam, Adelaide, 7 January 2004.  
 
lii TELO = Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation; EPRLF = Eelam Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Liberation Front; PLOTE = Peoples’ Liberation Organisation 
of Tamil Eelam; EROS = Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students. 
The two forces with some elements of Marxism were EROS and EPRLF, 
the latter strongest in areas where the old Ceylon Communist Party had 
support among Tamils and thus containing more menial caste members than 
other groups in the early-mid 1980s (from DBS Jeyaraj’s seminar at ICES in 
1986). For a list of most of the groups that existed/emerged around the 
1980s and brief histories, see http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Tamil_militant. 
 
liii For a long list, trawl through various sources: T. S. Subramanium, 
‘Chronicle of Murders,’ Frontline, 16/17, Aug. 14-29 1999; IPCS at 
http://www.ipcs.org/ and UTHR at http://www.uthr.org; as well as the web 
site put out by the Sinhala extremist group SPUR at http://www.spur.asn.au/ 
ltteatro.htm. 
 
liv The Malaiyaha Tamils refer to those who are also categorized as “Indian 
Tamils” and “Plantation Tamils,” that is, more recent migrants dating back 
to the nineteenth century. These migrants came mostly as plantation workers 
and menial labourers working especially in Colombo, but then dispersed all 
over the island. Concentrated especially in the Central Highland regions 
within the Sinhala heartland their location renders their politics more 
circumspect, though grapevine information suggests that they sympathize 
strongly with their Tamil brethren and the LTTE. In recent census it has 
been increasingly difficult for enumerators to differentiate between the two 
categories (information from Gerald Peiris). 
 
lv The approximate number of Tamils (both SLT and IT) within for the NP 
and EP in 2001 was 1,445,000. This should be set against the total of 
1,463,000 Tamils outside these regions. This means that perhaps 45% of the 
Sri Lanka Tamil people live outside the NP and EP. Figures from the 
Census of 1981 and personal communications from Gerald Peiris (July 
2006) who had access to the unpublished version of the partial 2001 census 
as well as previous studies by university ventures, inclusive of the 
University of Jaffna. 
 
lvi I took Colombo MC, Dehiwala-Mount Lavinia, Kotte, Kolonnawa and 
Wattala-Mabole to constitute “Greater Colombo” and excluded Moratuwa. 
My computations are based on figures supplied by Peiris (email, July 2006). 
For background information on several issues pertaining to the present 
situation, see G. H. Peiris, 2006 Sri Lanka. The Challenges of the New 
Millennium, Kandy: Creative Printers. 
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lvii For critical information on this issue, see the articles by G. H. Peiris (note 
43). 
 
 lviii That this policy is widely accepted and even praised by many ordinary 
Tamil people, educated and less educated alike, is not in question (D. 
Hellman-Rajanayagam, 1994 The Tamil Tigers. Armed Struggle for Identity, 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994) pp. 136, 144; Roberts, Tiger Martyrs 
(fn. 22) pp.494-96; and Pape, Dying (note 14) pp.142, 145.  
 
lix Pape, Dying (note 14) p.146. Pape adheres to this position despite his 
insistence that the LTTE is “explicitly antireligious” (Ibid., pp.16 & 149). 
He confronts this seeming contradiction directly by resorting to an 
instrumentalist interpretation: it is “all the more important to recognize how 
much even this secular group depends on religious notions of martyrdom to 
mobilize public support for suicide operations” (Ibid., p.9). 
 
lx Pape, Dying (note 14) p.140, emphasis mine. 
 
lxi Note Pape’s footnote 44 (p.302) where he speaks of “Tamil fears of 
cultural transformation” and cites Pfaffenberger’s articles as the authority for 
this conclusion. Pape’s reading of the changes in the institutional domination 
of the pilgrimage site at Kataragama and his generalization from a highly 
specific case presented by Bryan Pfaffenberger (‘The Cultural Dimensions of 
Tamil Separatism’, Asian Survey 21 (1981) pp.1145-47 and ‘The Kataragama 
Pilgrimage: Hindu-Buddhist Interaction and Its Significance in Sri Lanka’s 
Polyethnic Social System’, Journal of Asian Studies 38 (1979) pp. 253-80) is 
a serious misinterpretation of the religious pluralism and complex forms of 
encompassment and coexistence in Asia – a typical error for the either/or 
reasoning that underpins Western understandings of religion. 
 
lxii Note A. J. Wilson, Chelvanayakam (note 39) p.123 and Gunatilleke, 
Negotiations for the Resolution of the Ethnic Conflict (Colombo: Marga 
Institute, 2001) p.17-18.  
 
lxiii In the last decade or so sporadic attacks have been launched on Christian 
churches, generally Pentecostal, but also Catholic, in the Sinhala-majority 
areas; and state agencies have been lethargic in their counter measures and 
investigations. This is partly an intra-Sinhalese issue, but is significant in 
revealing virulent threads of Buddhist intolerance. 
lxiv Personal observations as well as literature that is summarised in Roberts, 
Tamil Tiger Martyrs (note 22) pp.500-04. See R. Gombrich & G. 
Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed. Religious Change in Sri Lanka 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), Tanaka, Patrons (note 22) and 
Bastin, Domain (note 22) for specific illustrations.  
lxv Bastin, Domain (note 12); Gananath Obeyesekere, ‘The Fire-walkers of 
Kataragama: The Rise of Bhakti Religiosity in Buddhist Sri Lanka’, Journal 
of Asian Studies 37 (1978) pp.457-76 and ‘Popular Religions’, in Tissa 
Fernando and R N Kearney (eds.) Modern Sri Lanka: A Society in Transition 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, (1979) pp.201-26; R. L. Stirrat, Power 
and Religiosity in a Post-colonial Setting. Sinhala Catholics in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
and B. Pfaffenberger, Kataragama Pilgrimage (note 61). Through political 
manouevres Buddhist authorities secured symbolic primacy and institutional 
control at Kataragama. It appears that Pfaffenberger’s description of this 
process led Pape to assume that the total exclusion of Hindu establishments 
had been effected (when, in fact, the deities of the Hindu kovil are the chief 
site of supplication for people of all faiths). 
 
lxvi Roberts, Tamil Tiger Martyrs (note 22) pp.494-95.  
 
lxvii There also were significant numbers of Muslims (28,885 or 27.1 
percent) and a small minority of Buddhists (3.2 percent, virtually all 
Sinhalese) in Mannar District in 1981 (Census of Population and Housing, 
1981, p. 27). These figures are no longer valid. 
 
lxviii These include Frs. Emmanuel, Kili, Bernard, and Chandrakanthan. 
Among the several speakers at the opening ceremony for a media-college 
near Kilinochchi held on 26 November 2004 was a Catholic priest. The 
keynote speaker was Thamil Chelvam. Sivaram and Thiru Master were 
among the other speakers (my observations). 
 
lxix Sri Kantha, E-mail to Robert Pape, 24 July 2004, in Sachi Sri Kantha, 
‘On Educating Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago,’ 
www.sangam.org representing the Ilankai Tamil Sangam, namely, the 
Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in USA. Here Sri Kantha has computed 
the identities from the names listed in LTTE’s Sooriya Puthalvargal 2003 
Souvenir. Also see fn. 75 below. 
 
lxx Note that there were a few Muslims too in the LTTE cadre in the early 
days of their struggle. But as the Eastern Province became a significant part 
of the political equations of the island, the sharp enmity between Tamil and 
Muslim in that province and a fear that they would serve as a fifth column 
seems to have moved the LTTE in October 1990 to declare Muslims in the 
Northern Province to be persona non grata. This cruel act of eviction at 
short notice also involved some appropriation of valued goods (S. H. 
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Hasbullah, Muslim Refugees. The Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic 
Conflict Colombo: Unie Arts for RAAF, 2001).  
 
lxxi For instance J. Uyangoda, Questions of Sri Lanka’s Minority Rights 
(Colombo: Uni Arts for ICES, 2001) and magazine articles in the quarterly 
issues of Pravāda, and subsequently its continuation as Polity, especially 
Uyangoda’s article in Polity 3/3 (April 2006) pp.4-6. Also see Godfrey 
Gunatilleke (note 62) p.27. 
     
lxxii Information from K. Sivathamby and a Tamil administrator friend who 
was the father’s boss at one point of time. 
 
lxxiii This segment is partly based on my knowledge of beach seine fishing, 
Tanaka (note 22), email note sent by Timmo Gaasbeek who has married 
locally in the EP as well as a note about the migrant landlords in B. O’Duffy 
(note 41) p.268.  
lxxiv The Civiyār were traditionally associated with palanquin bearing. 
Ariyalai and Kalliyankādu are among their central localities. In the 20th 
century they had a major interest in the pharmaceutical trade and many 
entered the professions, while Sittampalam was a MP and a Minister in the 
first cabinet under D. S. Senanayake in the 1940s/50s (information from S. 
Kasynathan). 
lxxv In his ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,’ American Political 
Science Review 97 (2003) p.343, Pape refers to the Tigers having 
“elements of Marxist Leninism.” He is even more forthright in his 
newspaper article in the New York Times reproduced in full by Satchi Sri 
Kantha (note 75 below). The LTTE has certainly proclaimed its desire to 
establish a “socialist state,” but that is, of course, not the same as Marxism 
of a Leninist kind. Indeed, Narayan Swamy emphasises that Pirapāharan 
has shown “near total disinterest in Marxist politics and ideology” (Tigers 
(note 3) p.51).  
 
lxxvi Email note from Sri Kantha to Pape, 27 June 2006: ‘Dear Bob Pape, … 
You have taken a little bit of poetic license in tagging the LTTE as a 
‘Marxist group’, right? Where did you find a recent reference to the LTTE 
as a “Marxist group”?’ 
   The letter from this Tamil medical doctor was impelled by considerable 
irritation that Pape had given an interview for publication in the American 
Conservative, 18 July 2005, where he had carefully avoided reference to 
data supplied previously – in mid-2004 -- by Sri Kantha: ‘In 2004, for your 
query, I provided information that LTTE suicide cadres come from both 
Hindu and Christian families, right? Why did you fail to mention the 
'Christian families'? Is it because, this would offend the sentiments of the 
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American Conservative readership?” See Sri Kantha, ‘On Educating 
Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago,’ www.sangam.org 
representing the Ilankai Tamil Sangam, namely, the Association of Tamils 
of Sri Lanka in USA. 
 
lxxvii Information from a young Tamil student who lived in the Jaffna 
Peninsula in the 1980s and 1990s as well as S. Kasynathan of Melbourne. 
 
lxxviii D. Hellmann-Rajanyagam, ‘The Jaffna Social System: Continuity and 
Change under Conditions of War’, Internationales Asien Forum 24 (1993) 
p.274 and O’Duffy (fn. 41) p.268. 
 
lxxix Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) pp.50ff, 108-12, 126-35, 139-42, 
152 and ‘Islam and Al Qaeda’, Ami Pedhazur (ed.) Root Causes of Suicide 
Terrorism. The Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006) 
pp.122-31. Also stressed by Scott Atran, ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, 
Science 299/56 (March 2003).  
 
lxxx Pirapāharan himself married an “island Vellalar” lady, while Kittu 
(Krishnakumar Sathasivam) married a Catholic medical student from 
Mirusuvil whose background was solid middle class and was increasingly 
drawn into its religious practices (sources: two different Tamil informants). 
From the context I inferred that “island Vellalar” was deemed to be lower in 
status in comparison with the Vellalar of the Jaffna Peninsula. 
 
lxxxi See Adele Ann [Balasingham], Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers 
(Jaffna: LTTE, 1993) and The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil 
Resistance (Mitcham: Fairmax, 2001).  
 
lxxxii Interview with Sita (code name), an ex-fighter who lost a leg in late 
1990 (in London, 3 March 2007). 
  
lxxxiii See ABC broadcast: ‘Sri Lanka. The Truth Tigers’, 15/ 5/ 2002, 
abstract on http://www.abc.net.au/ foreign/ stories/s553001.html. Also see 
‘Gajaani: ‘The Tiger's fighter journalist – “My dream is Tamil Eelam”,’ in 
http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/gajani.htm. 
 
lxxxiv Neloufer de Mel, ‘Agent or Victim? The Sri Lankan Woman Militant 
in the Interegnum’, in M. Roberts (ed.) Sri Lanka. Collective Identities 
Revisited (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1998) p.200.  
 
lxxxv Ibid., pp.208-11. The Tamil text is the Catakantarāvanan Katai as 
interpreted by David Shulman, Bandits, (note 20).  
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lxxxvi Pape, Strategic Logic (note 72) pp.351-52.  
 
lxxxvii See Elster (note 28) pp. 248-49 and Gambetta (note 28) pp.261-63. 
Moghadam, however, has questioned these figures both for the LTTE and 
in broader terms (Assaf Moghadam, ‘Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and 
the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win’, Studies in 
Conflict & Terroriam 29 (2006) pp.708-09, 713).  
lxxxviii The IPKF deployed substantial manpower, estimated at around 
115,000 personnel in the three services, excluding policmen, by Jane’s 
Sentinel, Security Assessment – South Asia (Coulsdon, Surrey UK, Issue 
Ten, 2002) pp.481-492 – figures supplied by G.H. Peiris). This is double 
the proportion that the Colombo-centred government is conventionally said 
to have in place in the north and east. 
 
lxxxix Premadasa’s government even supplied arms to the LTTE. As the 
IPKF left, the LTTE proceeded to eliminate the other militant Tamil groups 
who opposed them and/or had worked within the IPKF umbrella. Having 
seen to these elements in the first half of 1990, circa June 1990 they 
simultaneously surrounded the police stations maintained by the state. 
Some 900 policemen then surrendered on orders from Colombo. About 650 
of these men, the Muslims and Sinhalese, were then killed --- the Tamils 
being spared and even recruited into LTTE service. On the 1989/90 
negotiations, see especially articles by Chandrakanthan and Jayetilleke in 
Rupesinghe, 2006, vol. 1.  
 
xc Vijaya Kumaratunga, a matinee idol turned politician, was for political 
compromise and visited the LTTE-held territory in 1986(?). He was 
assassinated on 16 February 1988 by an indigenist extreme Sinhala 
insurgent group – either because he posed an alternative opposition voice, or 
because of such overtures to the Tamils, or perhaps for both reasons. 
Chandrika Kumaratunga was at one with her husband on this issue. 
 
xci When the helicopter bearing the government’s peace negotiators touched 
down in the Jaffna Peninsula in early 1995, it was greeted rapturously by 
the crowd assembled at that point. Moreover, Chandrika Kumaratunga 
became something like a pop-idol or miraculous deity among the Tamil 
people of the Jaffna Peninsula for a short while. Daya Somasundaram even 
referred to the milieu as “Chandrika mania” (personal communication). 
This reaction disconcerted the LTTE leadership quite noticeably (grapevine 
information from Tamils in the north at that time – whose names cannot be 
conveyed).  
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xcii The literature on the various peace negotiations is enormous. See 
Gunatilleke (note 70) and the various essays in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.) 
Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka, 2 vols. (Colombo: Foundation for 
Coexistence, 2005) for further details. For a good summary review of the 
whole conflict, see O’Duffy (note 41). 
 
xciii Stephen Hopgood, ‘Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002’, in D. Gambetta (ed.) 
Making Sense of  Suicide Missions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) pp.67-68 & 44.  
 
xciv Ibid, p. 55.  
 
xcv The capable leaders who were assassinated by suicide bombers include 
President Premadasa, Gamini Dissanayake, ex-General Lucky Algama, 
General Parami Kulatunge and Admiral Clancy Fernando. Ranjan Wijeratne 
was killed by a roadside bomb, Lakshman Kadirgamar by a sniper. Tamil 
moderates who represented an alternative voice were also eliminated by 
various means: Amirthalingam & Yogeswaran in a no-escape shooting, 
Neelan Tiruchelvam by suicide bomber. This is just the tip of an iceberg: 
the web references in note 53 provide fuller lists. 
 
xcvi The phrase “hurting stalemate” is deployed by O’Duffy (note 41, p.275) 
but is evidently derived from elsewhere. Note, however, that the LTTE is 
still outmuscled in number of fighting personnel and is subject to the state’s 
command of the air.  
xcvii Assaf Moghadam, ‘The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal 
Approach’, in Ami Pedhahzur (ed.) Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism (2006) 
pp.85-86. Also argued by Atran (note 78). 
xcviii I have been assisted here by personal communications from Jagath 
Senaratne and a Tamil friend. 
xcix See Shanaka Jayasekara, ‘Air capabilities of global terror groups and 
non-formal states’, Daily Mirror, May 2005. Also see B. Raman, ‘The 
World's First Terrorist Air Force’, Observer Research Forum, June 2005 
(sent to me by Victor Melder). For a sober evaluation of the recent air raid, 
see G. H. Peiris, ‘An Aerial Bombardment: Impulses and Implications’, 
South Asia Intelligence Review Vol. 5, No. 38, 2 April 2007.  
c Anthony Davis, ‘Tiger International. How a Secret Global Network keeps 
Sri Lankan Tamil Guerilla Organization Up and Killing’, Asia Week (July 
1996) p.31.  
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ci G. H. Peiris, ‘Secessionist War and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational 
Impulse’, in KPS Gill & Ajai Sahni (eds.) The Global Threat of Terror. 
Ideological, Material & Political Linkages (Delhi: Roli Books, Bulwark 
Books & Institute for Conflict Management, 2002) p.115. Also O’Duffy 
(note 41) p. 272.  
 
cii Verdery 1999: 107-26 and Roberts 2007a. 
 
ciii Information from various Tamil friends as well as Sayilakumari Visahan 
nee Kanagasabapathy, sister of Radha, an LTTE commander, who died in 
May 1987. I have also been shown (at the home of a pro-LTTE well-wisher) 
a video of Victor’s body being paraded in a utility van in the northern 
regions in late 1986. 
 
civ Jeyaraj 2006. Jeyaraj notes that this first celebration was “a restricted 
affair [where] the highlight was a highly emotional address delivered 
extemporaneously by Prabakharan to his enraptured followers.” 
 
cv For elaboration of the context and implications of this change, see 
Roberts, Pragmatic Action, 2006: 84-86 and 2007c. 
 
cvi Natali 2005 and www.TamilNet.com, 27 Nov. 1998. 
 
cvii Roberts 2005: 81-82 and information conveyed by Joe Ariyaratnam, a 
journalist who has been residing in Jaffna during the past decade. 
 
cviii Mines 2005: 31, Shulman 1980: 45-46, 64-65, 105 and, for evidence of 
the ash and seed metaphor in poetry, Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2005: 124, 
141. 
 
cix Mines 2005; chap. X is especially pertinent here. Note: raw substances 
are used in the cooking process and thus, “ponkal cooking is an evocative 
metonym for reproduction and increase in general and for [festivals] in 
particular,” while “symbolizing the human capacity to convert death into 
life-sustaining growth with the help of gods and the ancestors” (Mines 2005: 
151-52)].   
 
cx I am indebted to my old friend, S. V Kasynathan of Point Pedro and 
Melbourne, for this clarification. 
 
cxi Sakti can be regarded as an ecumenical idea that permeates all the major 
religions in southern Asia, including the Christian persuasions. Its 
significance in LTTE activities is elaborated upon in all my articles in 
different, albeit overlapping, ways: see Roberts 2005a & b, 2006, 2007a, b 
& c. 
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cxii Schalk 2003: 404. He adds: “what exactly rises? One supporter told me 
that a (collective) amma ‘soul’ of the members of the movement rises. His 
view is not sanctioned by the LTTE, but it is not rejected either.” 
 
cxiii Email note from Rick Weiss in Auckland, 20 Feb. 2007. 
 
cxiv Information conveyed by S. V. Kasynathan (email notes, 20 Feb. 2007) 
using the Madras University Lexicon (1982 edn.) and adding his own 
elaborations. Note the semantic overlap with the concepts pongu and 
ponkal.  
 
cxv For the Saivite character of some familial rites, see the Catholic priest 
Chandrakanthan’s affirmation in 2000: 164-65. By “enlivened 
photographs,” I refer to framed pictures of a māvīrar on a wall before which 
a lamp may be lit on special occasions, or kept lit permanently, so that the 
picture takes on the character of a religious icon where the divine character 
is regarded as immanent within its form and brought into being by the 
reverence of bodily deportment and sentiment. 
 
cxvi Trawick 1997: 155, 180 and Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2005: 133, 140-41, 
145. 
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